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Capitalmarkets are cast as both villain and hero in the climate playbill.
The trillionsof dollars requiredto combat climate change leave ample room
for heroicsfrom the financial sector. For the time being, however, capital
continues to flow readily toward fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive
industries. Drawing on the results of an empirical study, this Article posits
that ratings of corporate climate risk and governance can help overcome
pervasive information asymmetries and nudge investors toward more
climate-consciousinvestment choices with welfare-enhancingeffects.
In the absence of a meaningful price on carbon, three private ordering
initiatives are trying to mobilize capital markets as aforce for good in the
war on carbon. But shareholderclimate activism, calls for better climaterelatedfinancialdisclosures, and the divestment movement have yet to usher
in the paradigm shift toward low-carbon capitalism.
Corporateclimate ratings overcome existing information asymmetries to
nudge investors toward more carbon-conscious allocation of their assets.
Every year, ratingagencieslike Standard& Poor's,Moody's, andFitchpass
judgment on over one hundredtrillion dollars'worth of securities. Modeled
after these well-establishedratingsof creditworthiness, independent ratings
of companies' climate risk and governance can redirect the flow of capital
away from high-carbon assets toward more climate-friendly options
without the need for government authorization or other market-distorting
interventions.
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A series ofsurvey experiments, with overfifteen hundredparticipants,test
and demonstrate the capacity of corporate climate ratings to promote lowcarbon investment. Inclusion of climate ratings among the performance
metrics commonly consideredby investors significantly increasesinvestment
in the stock of companies with favorable climate ratings, even when other
stocks boast a stronger returnprofile. Variationsin the ratings'framingand
format, informed by insights from behavioral economics and finance,
facilitate recommendationsfor best practices andfuture research.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................1211

I.

CURRENT EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE
WAR ON CARBON - A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT....................................1219

A. The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures.........1220
B. Shareholder Activism: Climate Action 100+...............................1227
C. The Movement for Fossil Fuel Divestment ................................. 1235
II. THE CASE FOR CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS .................................. 1241

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Building on Ratings of Creditworthiness.....................................1244
The Comparative Benefits of Climate Over ESG Ratings...........1247
Climate Ratings Are Attainable Here and Now...........................1249
A Complement to Carbon Pricing................................................1253
Common Ground Amidst Partisan Climate Politics .................... 1256

III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: NUDGING FINANCIAL MARKETS.....................1259

A. Methods and Data ........................................................................ 1260
B. Experiment 1: Climate Ratings Impact Investor Choices............1262
1. Experimental Design..............................................................1262
2. Results....................................................................................1264
C. Experiment 2: The Impact of Framing and Format ..................... 1266
1. Experimental Design..............................................................1266
2. Results....................................................................................1269
3. Controlling for Individual Characteristics ............................. 1273
D. Insights, Caveats, and Suggestions for Future Research ............. 1274
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................1279

APPENDIX .................................................................................................

1281

53.1209]

CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS

1211

INTRODUCTION

Capital markets have a conflicted relationship with climate change. Gone
are the days when companies and their shareholders could afford to simply
ignore the risks associated with global warming, sea level rise, and other
manifestations of our planet's changing climate.' Too large is the physical
risk flowing from more frequent extreme weather events and long-term shifts
in climate patterns that threaten food and water supplies.2 Add to that the
transition risk arising from changes in policy, technology, and markets as part
of the shift to a low-carbon economy and it becomes clear why climate
change has truly arrived on Wall Street.3
Considering the ubiquity and severity of these risks, it comes as no
surprise that investors increasingly urge publicly traded companies to
disclose climate-related risk and to develop more decisive strategies for
mitigation and adaptation. 4 Regulatory pressure, too, is mounting. Over three
dozen central banks and other financial regulators representing five
continents have sounded a clarion call for better disclosure of climate risk on
financial markets.5 Yet, companies continue to vary dramatically in their
1.

See, e.g., Brad Plumer, Companies See Climate Change Hitting Their Bottom Lines in

the Next 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2XodNCZ [https://perma.cc/JZ99EEMN] (reporting estimates of aggregate corporate costs imposed by climate change of
approximately $1 trillion in the coming decades).
2.
For an illustrative example of physical risk, see LUCIA BEVERE ET AL., Swiss RE INST.,
NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2018: "SECONDARY" PERILS ON THE

FRONTLINE 1, 2, 6 (2019) (reporting a record $219 billion in insured losses from natural
catastrophes for 2017-18 alongside greater frequency and severity of extreme weather events).
According to the National Centers for Environmental Information, eighteen separate billiondollar weather and climate disaster events ravaged the United States in the first nine months of
2021 alone, causing losses of $105 billion and bringing the 5-year loss average to $140 billion
per annum. See Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Time Series, NOAA,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/time-series [https://perma.cc/3799-HZHL].
3.
For an eloquent illustration of climate-related transition risk, see Sarah E. Light, The
Law of the Corporationas EnvironmentalLaw, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 167-68 (2019) (discussing
investigations by the SEC and the New York Attorney General's office into whether ExxonMobil
misled its investors about the possibility that the company's oil reserves could become
inaccessible if future climate regulations prohibited their extraction).
4.

See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 2019 STATUS REPORT,

at

iii

(2019) ("[T]here is a growing demand for . . . climate-related financial information by
investors."). For a more generalized account of the virtues of mandatory disclosure in financial
markets, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory

Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
5.

See NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., A CALL FOR ACTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AS

A SOURCE OF FINANCIAL RISK 5, 31 (2019) (emphasizing the importance of a "robust and
internationally consistent climate and environmental disclosure framework"); see also Sarah E.
Light & Christina P. Skinner, Banks and Climate Governance, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1894, 193440 (2021) (reporting on emerging climate governance efforts by major banks shaping borrower
behavior through exercise of their lending power and funding low-carbon projects).
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management and disclosure of climate risk, with many failing to consider, let
alone disclose, the potential adverse impacts of climate change on their
business.6
It is easy to forget, amidst calls for better climate risk disclosure and
management, that climate change poses not only a threat for financial markets
but also an enormous opportunity.] After all, where else should the massive
amounts of capital come from that are needed for a successful response to the
climate crisis? According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
the energy sector alone will require investment of approximately $2.4 trillion
annually over the next decade and a half if we are to prevent global warming
from reaching the tipping point toward massive and irreversible damage to
the global ecosystem.8 Others have pegged the investment needs for climateresilient, low-carbon infrastructure at $90 trillion, or $6 trillion annually,
between 2016 and 2030.9 Whatever the exact number, actual investment
flows lag woefully behind projected needs. Recent data suggests that global
climate investment averages below $500 billion annually, roughly one-tenth

6.
See, e.g., Roshaan Wasim, Corporate (Non)Disclosureof Climate ChangeInformation,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2019) ("[T]here is virtually no discussion of climate change
risks in publicly traded companies' filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and on

other public

platforms."); TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, supra note 4,

at

iv ("[M]ore companies need to consider the potential impact of climate change and disclose
material findings.").
7.
Close to 90% of companies, cities, and regions submitting voluntary climate-related
disclosures are able to identify business opportunities as part of their management of climate risk.
See Wasim, supra note 6, at 1320; see also ANDREW CLAPPER ET AL., WORLD WILDLIFE FUND ET
AL., POWER FORWARD 3.0: HOW THE LARGEST U.S. COMPANIES ARE CAPTURING BUSINESS VALUE

WHILE ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2017) ("The largest companies in the United States are
steadily increasing their clean energy and energy efficiency efforts while improving their bottom
lines."); Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate Litigation and
Directors' Duties, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 313, 351 (2020) ("Even for carbon-major corporations,
energy transitions away from fossil fuels can be profitable."). The Global Commission on the
Economy and Climate expects direct economic gains from decisive global climate action to
exceed $26 trillion by the end 2030. See HELEN MOUNTFORD ET AL., GLOB. COMM'N ON THE
ECON. &

CLIMATE, UNLOCKING THE INCLUSIVE GROWTH

STORY OF THE

2 1ST

CENTURY:

ACCELERATING CLIMATE ACTION IN URGENT TIMES 8-9 (2018).
8.

See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF

1.5 0 C:

0

AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C ABOVE PREINDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE
CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 22 (2018).
9.

See JAN CORFEE-MORLOT ET AL., GLOB. COMM'N ON THE ECON. & CLIMATE, THE

SUSTAINABLE

INFRASTRUCTURE

DEVELOPMENT 8, 23 (2016).

IMPERATIVE:

FINANCING

FOR

BETTER

GROWTH

AND
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of the capital required to effectively combat climate change-and less than
the annual subsidy hand-out to fossil fuel interests. 10
In the words of Bob Litterman, former Head of Risk Management at
Goldman Sachs, "[C]apital is flowing freely in the wrong direction, emissions
continue to rise, catastrophic climate-related damages proliferate, and the
threat of truly cataclysmic impacts increases."" Why do financial markets
continue to fund carbon capitalism instead of leveraging the investment
needed to tackle the climate crisis? How can we unleash the power of capital
markets as a force for good in the war on carbon? These are the questions this
Article sets out to answer.
Part One takes stock of existing initiatives to mobilize financial markets
in the fight against climate change and explains their limitations. Economists
have long advocated for a price on carbon, in the form of a carbon tax or capand-trade regime, to internalize the social cost of greenhouse gas emissions
and to provide market incentives for their abatement." But a meaningful price
on carbon remains politically elusive in many of the highest-emitting regions

10. PADRAIG OLIVER ET AL., CLIMATE POL'Y INITIATIVE, GLOBAL CLIMATE FINANCE: AN
UPDATED VIEW 2 (2018) (estimating that global annual climate investment from combined public

and private sources was below $500 billion from 2012-2016); see CORFEE-MORLOT ET AL., supra

note 9, at 8, 12, 23 (estimating the investment necessary to address climate change to be $90
trillion from 2016 to 2030, or $6 trillion annually, and reporting $550 billion in fossil fuel
subsidies for 2014, not counting the subsidy value inherent in the widely afforded ability to
externalize associated environmental costs); see also Sophie Yeo, Where Climate Cash Is
Flowing and Why It's Not Enough, 573 NATURE 328, 329 (2019) ("[Climate investment] figures
are rising, but researchers say that banks, investors and governments are not spending anywhere
near enough money to stem the impacts of climate change and they continue to fund projects
that worsen the problem."). President Biden acknowledged the urgent need to dramatically
increase investment in low-carbon, climate-friendly assets, including the development of a
climate finance plan, in his Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,
issued within a week of taking office. Exec. Order No. 14008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021).
11. Statement from Robert B. Litterman, Partner Kepos Cap. & Former Head of Risk
Mgmt., Goldman Sachs, to the Senate Special Comm. on the Climate Crisis, Climate Change Is
a Risk Management Failure that Can and Must Be Fixed Immediately (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www. schatz. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Litterman%20Testimony%20short%20version%
20.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXB5-CDPE].
12. See, e.g., David Klenert et al., Making Carbon Pricing Work for Citizens, 8 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 669, 669 (2018) ("Economic analyses have long recommended carbon pricing
as an indispensable strategy for efficiently reducing GHG emissions and tackling climate
change."); Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learnedfrom Three Decades of
Experience with Cap and Trade, 11 REV. ENV'TECON. &POL'Y 59,74 (2017) ("[C]ap-and-trade
merits serious consideration when regions, nations, or subnational jurisdictions are developing
policies to reduce GHG emissions."); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE STERN REVIEW 18 (2007) ("Establishing a carbon price, through tax, trading or regulation, is
an essential foundation for climate-change policy.").
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of the world.1 3 Without reliable government guidance, three initiatives are
seeking to fill the policy void, with limited success to date.
In 2015, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
responded to growing concerns over the financial impact of climate change
by creating the industry-led Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures, instructed to develop recommendations for consistent climaterelated risk disclosure by publicly traded companies. 4 The Task Force's
recommendations, released in 2017 after extensive stakeholder consultations,
have been well received by financial regulators, stock exchanges, credit
rating agencies, and asset managers.' 5 The corporate targets of these
recommendations, however, have responded less enthusiastically, with most
companies continuing to make no meaningful disclosures of their climaterelated risk.1 6 The tepid corporate reaction, coupled with the failure of the
SEC and regulators elsewhere to turn non-binding recommendations into
legal requirements, casts serious doubt on the near-term availability of
decision-useful climate disclosures to guide investor choices."
Lagging policy and regulatory action have united 615 institutional
investors controlling over $60 trillion in assets worldwide under the banner
of Climate Action 100+, an initiative seeking to convince companies to curb
emissions, improve climate governance, and strengthen climate-related

&

13. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, The Future of US Carbon-PricingPolicy, 1 ENV'T
ENERGY POL'Y & ECON. 8, 13-52 (2020) (discussing political obstacles to carbon pricing in the
United States); Ian Bailey et al., The Fall (andRise) of Carbon Pricing in Australia: A Political
Strategy Analysis ofthe Carbon PollutionReduction Scheme, 21 ENv'TPOL. 691, 691-93 (2012)
(analyzing the political strategies deployed for and against Australia's carbon pricing policy
efforts); Jesse D. Jenkins, PoliticalEconomy Constraints on Carbon PricingPolicies: What Are

the Implicationsfor Economic Efficiency, EnvironmentalEfficacy, and Climate Policy Design?,
69 ENERGY POL'Y 467, 469-76 (2014) (noting the multitude of political economy factors that
combine to prevent adoption of carbon pricing at the socially optimal level).
14. See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, PHASE I REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 8-9 (2016).

15. See Press Release, Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, More than 1,000
Global Organizations Declare Support for the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures and Its Recommendations (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/press/morethan- 1000-global-organizations-declare-support-for-the-task-force-on-climate-related-financialdisclosures-and-its-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/E8R6-RLPT].
16.

See TRUCOST ESG ANALYSIS, S&P GLOBAL, BEST PRACTICES IN CORPORATE CLIMATE

DISCLOSURE: HOW THE LEADERS ARE LEADING 2, 8 (2019) (reporting that over one-third of
companies issue no climate-related disclosures whatsoever, with others disclosing little, if any,
information of value to investors).
17. See infra Part I.A; see also Ian Edwards et al., Climate-RelatedFinancialDisclosures
in the Public Sector, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 588, 589 (2020) (expressing concern that
implementation of the Task Force's recommendations is proceeding too slowly to change investor
behavior at a meaningful scale).

53.1209]

CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS

1215

disclosures. 8 Between 2017 and 2019, annual proxy seasons witnessed a
steady rise in shareholder climate activism, coaxing commitments to better
climate governance from Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and other top
emitters.1 9 The systemic, economy-wide risks associated with climate change
have produced a paradigm shift among institutional investors based on a
simple cost-benefit analysis. Calculating that the agency costs and firmspecific losses from their engagement with carbon-intensive companies will
be outweighed by the overall benefits of better climate governance for their
diversified portfolio holdings, institutional investors are increasingly
abandoning their historical reluctance to exercise corporate governance
rights. 20 But the momentum of shareholder climate activism has stalled of late
raising concerns that Climate Action 100+ and similar initiatives may not be
able to scale at the pace required to effectively mobilize financial markets in
the fight against climate change."
While shareholder climate activists advocate for change from within, the
fossil fuel divestment movement urges investors to vote with their feet.22
Since 2014, more than 1,300 institutional investors managing nearly $15
trillion in assets around the world have committed to dropping some, if not
all, of their fossil fuel holdings. 23 With this "exodus" strategy, the divestment
movement hopes to both delegitimize the fossil fuel industry and reduce its
access to capital. Critics note, however, that the size of the global financial
market and the liquidity of most fossil fuel stocks allow any divested holdings
to quickly find their way into the portfolios of other, less concerned

18. Home
Page,
CLIMATE
ACTION
100+,
http://www.climateaction100.org
[https://perma.cc/T7R4-3HKU].
19. See infra Part I.B (describing shareholder climate activism at these companies); see also
Shirley Westcott, Surprises from the 2018 Proxy Season, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.

GOVERNANCE (June 27, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/27/surprises-from-the2018-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/7H4F-PGEJ] (reporting several successful shareholder
resolutions requiring fossil fuel multinationals to make commitments related to climate change).
20. See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-6
(2020) (presenting a persuasive argument for the shift from a firm-centric to a portfolio-oriented
governance approach among widely diversified institutional investors).
21. See infra Part I.B.
22.

See generally ALBERT

O.

HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO

DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing the range of options open to
members of a deteriorating organization, from staying and trying to effect change from within to
leaving and joining another, better organization).
23. 1200+
Divestment
Commitments,
GOFOSSILFREE,
https://web.archive.org/web/202110210153 36/https://gofossilfree.org/divestment/commitments.
Some participants limit their commitment to divestment of a subset of fossil fuel companies, such
as the coal industry, continuing to invest in other fossil assets. See, e.g., infra note 144 and
accompanying text, explaining the exit of Stanford University's endowment from coal but not oil
and gas.
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investors.2 4 These and other limitations," including the failure to engage retail
investors, prevent the divestment movement from turning financial markets
into a full-blown battlefield in the war on carbon.
Part Two makes the conceptual case for corporate climate ratings to
promote more carbon-sensitive asset allocation on capital markets. Recent
advances in behavioral economics, consumer psychology, and related fields
have produced a veritable "behavior change revolution." Subtle changes to
the decision environment, or nudges, 26 have enabled stakeholders to
overcome biases and other cognitive limitations, resulting in welfareenhancing choices across a wide range of contexts, from healthier food
selection" to greater retirement savings. 2 8 This Article posits that ratings of
corporate climate risk and governance can help overcome existing

24.

See ATIF ANSAR ET AL., STRANDED ASSETS PROGRAMME, STRANDED ASSETS AND THE

FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN: WHAT DOES DIVESTMENT MEAN FOR THE VALUATION OF

FOSSIL FUEL ASSETS? 70 (2013); see also Randall Morck et al., The StockMarket and Investment:
Is the Market a Sideshow?, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, at 207
(contending that "liquidity ... [is one of] the fundamental determinants of stock values"); Robert
Schwarz, Reinvesting After Divesting: A Few Fossil-Fuel-FreeOptions, 6 J. ENV' T INVESTING,
no. 1, 2015, at 43 (noting that money divested from fossil fuel companies and reinvested in banks
will very likely end up funding such companies again); ALISON KIRSCH ET AL., RAINFOREST
ACTION NETWORK, BANKING ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE FOSSIL FUEL FINANCE REPORT 2020, at
10-12 (2020) (criticizing the sustained growth in funding for fossil fuel ventures from the world's
largest banks). But see TruzaarDordi & Olaf Weber, The Impact of Divestment Announcements
on the Share Price of Fossil Fuel Stocks, SUSTAINABILITY, June 2019, at 11-14 (offering
empirical evidence of short-term depressions in stock prices for fossil fuel companies following
divestment events).
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. Nobel Laureate Richard Thaler and co-author Cass Sunstein, the founders of the nudge
movement, define the term as "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges
are not mandates." RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008); see also On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble,
Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098,

2100 (2008) (distinguishing "gentle nudges" from "forceful shoves").
27. See, e.g., L. R. Skov et al., Choice Architecture as aMeans To Change Eating Behaviour
in Self-Service Settings: A Systematic Review, 14 OBESITY REV. 187 (2013) (examining the use
of such nudges as "health labelling," "manipulating the plate and cutlery size," "assortment
manipulation," and "payment option manipulation"); David R. Just & Brian Wansink, Better
School Meals on a Budget: Using Behavioral Economics and FoodPsychology To Improve Meal

Selection, 24 CHOICES 1 (2009) (applying behavioral economics to influence healthier cafeteria
purchasing decisions).
28.

See, e.g., WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., AUTOMATIC: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA SAVES

(2009) (proposing automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans with options to opt out or
alter investment decisions); RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 309-22 (2015) (examining the use of behavioral economics in automatic enrollment
and "Save More Tomorrow" saving plans).
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information asymmetries and nudge investors toward more climateconscious investment choices with similarly welfare-enhancing effects.
Our proposal for corporate climate ratings builds on the well-established
system of bond ratings for financial markets. 29 For more than a century,
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and other rating agencies have collected,
analyzed, and translated a wide swath of complex information into a simple,
intuitively framed letter-grade rating of creditworthiness for bonds and
companies. 30 Our proposed ratings of corporate climate risk and governance
mimic this approach by gathering and analyzing information on a company's
greenhouse gas emissions, its exposure to and management of physical and
transitional climate risks, as well as related opportunities. The resulting
company-specific assessments empower investors to include climate-related
risks and opportunities in their decision-making process, for the dual benefit
of improving the return on their investments and redirecting the flow of
capital toward more climate-friendly assets.
Unlike novel requirements for financial disclosure and other well-meaning
reform proposals, corporate climate ratings are attainable in the here and now,
without the need for government authorization or other forms of marketdistorting regulatory intervention. 31 Private ordering efforts to collect
information on corporate climate risk and governance are already underway,
as evidenced by the voluntary reporting of climate-related information by
thousands of companies. 32 Corporate climate ratings would translate this and
other information into a clear and concise assessment of companies' climate
risks and performance. The dramatic rise of privately managed retirement
savings accounts and online brokerages, meanwhile, provides an opening for
climate-conscious employers and online trading platforms to include
corporate climate ratings among the performance metrics that guide investor
choices. If Robinhood traders can make or break companies like Hertz or
GameStop, and bring down entire hedge funds in the process, 33 imagine what
their collective energy could do to boost investment in low-carbon, climatefriendly assets.
29.

See infra Part II.A.

30.

See GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF

THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 5-19 (1938) (discussing the historical roots of bond ratings prompted by
the transition from relational lending to publicly traded debt instruments).
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See Companies Scores, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/companies/companies-scores
[https://perma.cc/6BGQ-6GXC];see also Virginia Harper Ho, NonfinancialRisk Disclosure and
the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 410 (2018) (explaining how the lack of
regulatory requirements for reporting climate-related information has produced a surge in private
ordering efforts, including private governance, self-regulation, and voluntary regulation).
33. See infra notes 243-245 and accompanying text.
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The Biden administration's commitment to climate action and its control
over Congress place a price on carbon, the historically elusive silver-bullet
policy favored by economists, into the realm of possibility. 34 A U.S. carbon
tax or cap-and-trade regime would, however, apply to only a fraction of
global greenhouse gas emissions, inviting companies to move their carbonintensive operations offshore, resulting in the relocation rather than reduction
of their greenhouse gas emissions. Comprehensive corporate climate ratings
enable investors to see through these and other circumvention strategies,
thereby enhancing the real-world reach and impact of carbon pricing
policies in the United States and beyond.3 5
From a political economy perspective, corporate climate ratings can create
much needed common ground amidst the growing political polarization over
climate change. As scientific consensus around the causes and effects of
climate change continues to solidify, the question of how to respond to the
climate crisis divides Democrats and Republicans more than ever. 36 Political
science posits that the American public's partisan divide over global warming
is driven by divergent views on the appropriate role, and size, of
government. 37 If the political controversy over climate action is, indeed, yet
another symptom of the age-old conflict between advocates of big
government and market fundamentalism, then corporate climate ratings may
point the way toward common ground. 38 Studies have repeatedly shown that,
whatever their general disagreement over regulatory interventions,
Democrats and Republicans alike overwhelmingly support the use of
informational nudges on high-profile policy issues. 39
Part Three offers empirical evidence of the capacity of corporate climate
ratings to nudge retail investors toward more climate-friendly decisionmaking. We conducted a series of incentivized survey experiments with over
34. But see Isobel Asher Hamilton, Elon Musk Said the Biden Administration Rejected His
Idea of a Carbon Tax as "Too Politically Difficult", BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-carbon-tax-biden-administration-rejected-teslaspacex-2021-2 [https://perma.cc/7ESW-B569].
35. See infra Part II.C.
36. See Riley E. Dunlap et al., The Political Divide on Climate Change: Partisan
Polarization Widens in the U.S., 58 ENV'T, no. 5, 2016, at 6-14; Elaine Kamarck, The
Challenging Politics of Climate
Change, BROOKINGS
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-of-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/V56Z-P5E9].
37.

See, e.g., NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A

HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL

WARMING 6 (2010) (recounting EPA findings that were accused of being "distorted by a political
agenda to expand government control over all aspects of our lives").
38. See infra Part I.D.
39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 187 (2016)
(presenting survey data on the bipartisan approval of recent nudge campaigns).
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fifteen hundred participants to test whether and how the inclusion of a climate
rating among the performance metrics displayed to investors affects their
choice of stocks. Our data provide strong evidence for the existence of a
climate ratings effect on investor decision making. 40 Drawing on insights
from behavioral economics and finance, we further tested and compared how
different rating formats bear on investor choices. 41 Our findings enable us to
offer initial recommendations for the implementation of corporate climate
ratings and to identify avenues for future research. 42

I.

CURRENT EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE WAR
ON CARBON-A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

From a macroeconomic perspective, virtually all climate policy seeks to
enlist the help of financial markets to achieve its objectives. Policymakers
offer tax breaks and other incentives to solar, wind, and other low-carbon
renewables in the hope that their public policy support will leverage private
investment.43 Economists endorse carbon pricing because of its twofold
impact on firm behavior and capital investment. In the near term, a carbon
tax or cap-and-trade regime requires producers to internalize the cost of their
emissions, thereby penalizing pollution and encouraging abatement.4 4 Over
time, this direct, static effect will be complemented by a more indirect,
dynamic effect of promoting increased investment in refinement of existing,
and development of new, abatement technologies. 45 The importance of such
macroeconomic effects notwithstanding, this section adopts a more
microeconomic perspective to focus on initiatives seeking to catalyze greater
climate action on financial markets by targeting behavior at the level of
individual firms and investors. These initiatives include the Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures,4 6 shareholder climate activism led by
Climate Action 100+,47 and the movement for fossil fuel divestment.4 8 All
three deserve credit for drawing attention to the critical role that capital
40.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.D.
43. See generally Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policyfor a Cleaner,
More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 303, 319-24 (2014) (discussing the
interplay between capital markets and tax credits for renewable energy).
44. See Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmentaland Technology Externalities:Policy
and Investment Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS, no. 2, 2007, at 137 (discussing the impact of
environmental policy on capital investment and technology innovation).
45. See id.
46. See infra Part I.A.
47. See infra Part I.B.
48. See infra Part I.C.
41.
42.
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markets as well as the companies and investors they connect have to play in
the war on carbon. But none has yet managed to sour the love affair between
financial markets and fossil fuels.
A. The Task Force on Climate-RelatedFinancialDisclosures
Policymakers and scholars have long recognized the paramount
importance of accurate information for the proper functioning of capital
markets. 49 In the words of the SEC, "[I]nvestors must have access to accurate
information important to making investment and voting decisions in order for
the financial markets to function effectively." 5 0 All over the world, securities
regulators require, in some form or other, disclosure of information deemed
relevant to market participants." As more frequent and more severe extreme
weather events continue to demonstrate the financial risks associated with
climate change," investors increasingly demand the inclusion of climaterelated risk in corporate disclosures. 53 But national regulators have been slow
to respond.

49. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 670 (1984) ("The dominating principle of securities
regulation is that anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he wants at
whatever price the market will sustain."); Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70
VA. L. REv. 755, 755 (1984) ("[S]ecurities laws ... seek to provide investors with the information
needed to trade intelligently in markets free of fraud and other abuse.").
50. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916,
23,921 (Apr. 22, 2016).
51.

See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosureas a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.

CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1995) ("Firms that issue securities in the public markets must provide
affirmative disclosures about the securities and the issuer. This is true not only in the United
States, but in most developed countries."). For a foundational comparative inquiry illustrating the
deep historical roots of mandatory disclosure laws across the globe, see Friedrich Kessler, The
American SecuritiesAct andIts Foreign Counterparts:A ComparativeStudy, 44 YALE L .J. 1133

(1935) (comparing disclosure requirements under U.S., German, English, and French law, among
others).
52. See, e.g., Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-ChangeBankruptcy, Probably Not
the Last, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-firstsee
also
[https://perma.cc/JPU9-BKUN];
climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006
CHRISTOPHER WATTS, ECONOMIST: INTEL. UNIT, THE COST OF INACTION: RECOGNISING THE

VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (Brian Gardner ed., 2015) (estimating the value of
financial assets at risk from climate change by 2100 at $43 trillion).
53. See, e.g., Wasim, supra note 6, at 1337 ("[I]nvestors are beginning to realize the
potential impacts of climate change on corporate financial value and are demanding more accurate
and insightful information from companies.").
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The SEC, for example, has not addressed the disclosure of climate-related
risk since its 2010 interpretive guidance.54 The Commission identified four
domains within its existing Regulation S-K5 5 that may require disclosures
related to climate change-description of business, legal proceedings, risk
factors, and management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and
results of operations. 56 The guidance goes on to list four sample scenarios of
climate-relevant issues that companies may need to consider for disclosure
legislation and regulation such as a national cap-and-trade regime,
international accords like the Kyoto Protocol, extreme weather events and
other physical impacts of climate change, as well as indirect consequences of
regulation or business trends.57
In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 guidance, Wall Street's top
regulator issued nearly fifty comment letters to companies assessing the
adequacy of their climate-related disclosures. 58 But the initial enthusiasm for
enforcement dissipated quickly with only three letters in 2012 and none in
2013.59 In its 2016 Regulation S-K Concept Release, the Commission raised
questions about sustainability reporting that promised a follow-up and,
perhaps, tightening of the 2010 guidance. 60 That promise, however, has yet
to materialize as the Commission's subsequent rulemaking proposals related
to Regulation S-K all but ignored climate-related disclosures. 61 In October
54. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010). The Commission did not issue its interpretative guidance on a whim
but, rather, in response to a series of petitions from large institutional investors and investor
groups. See id. at 6291 n.20.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 229. Regulation S-K lays out the standard instructions for disclosure under
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-qq.
56. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 6293-95.
57. Id. at 6295-97.
58.

See David Gelles, S.E.C. Is Criticizedfor Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk Disclosure,

N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), https://nyti.ms/lVglovz [https://perma.cc/W2E9-U5C7].
59. Id.
60. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure
Required by Regulation S-K (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/3310064.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q6T-UU4U].
61. See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, 105 (proposed Aug. 23, 2019);
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Proposed Rule on Management's Discussion and Analysis, Selected
Financial Data,
and Supplementary
Financial Information (Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2020/33-10750.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPC4-7HJJ]; see also
Allison Herren Lee, "Modernizing"Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/KTA8-WG25] (noting that the latest proposal "is most notable for
what it does not do: make any attempt to address investors' need for standardized disclosure on
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2020, the SEC issued the first significant revisions to Regulation S-K in over
thirty years but, once again, refused to reform the requirements for disclosure
of climate-related risk. 62 Enforcement through comment letters that address
the adequacy of companies' climate change-related disclosures, meanwhile,
has practically disappeared. 63 This steadfast refusal to engage with the
challenges and opportunities of climate disclosure stands in stark contrast to
a recent report issued by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
sounding a clarion call for more decisive action by regulators and markets
alike to measure, understand, and address climate-related risks to the U.S.
financial system. 64
At the international level, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors responded to growing concerns over the financial impact of
climate change by asking the Financial Stability Board to review how the
financial sector can take account of climate-related issues. 65 The Board, in
climate change risk"); Jill E. Fisch, Making SustainabilityDisclosureSustainable, 107 GEO. L.J.
923, 929, 956 (2019) (responding to the lack of SEC guidance with a proposal requiring a
"Sustainability Discussion and Analysis" to be included in annual reports to shareholders).
62. See generally Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg.
63,726 (Oct. 8, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240). In its final rule, the SEC went to
great lengths to explain why, despite comments and requests to incorporate climate change in its
disclosure requirements, the Commission chose not to incorporate it, emphasizing the "principlesbased nature of Item 101(c)." Id. at 63,734, 63,736-37.
63. See Mindy Lubber, Comments on the Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, HARV. L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(July
18,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/18/comments-on-the-climate-risk-disclosure-act-of2019/ [https://perma.cc/9TFY-JP2G] ("A search for SEC comment letters asking issuers to
improve their climate-related disclosure in Commission filings reveals only one such letter from
January 2017 to [July 2019] .... "); see also Andrew Ramonas, SEC's Lee Looks To Avoid
'Gotcha' Enforcement on ESG Reporting, BLOOMBERG
L.
(June 7, 2021),
https ://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/secs-lee-looks-to-avoid-gotcha-enforcement-onesg-reporting [https://perma.cc/4HQL-BDNY] (commenting that companies should receive
notice to adjust their actions to conform with SEC regulations).
64. See Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System, COMMODITY FUTUREs
TRADING COMM'N 1 (Sept. 9, 2020) (urging that "U.S. financial regulators must recognize that
climate change poses serious emerging risks to the U.S. financial system" while clarifying that
"the financial system can itself be a catalyst for investments that accelerate economic resilience
and the transition to a net-zero emissions economy"); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Modernizing
ESG Disclosure, U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2022) (proposing a combination of principlesbased and prescriptive approaches to improve disclosure of climate risk). For evidence of the
SEC's growing interest in climate disclosure under the Biden administration, see infra Part II.
65. See Press Release 91/2015, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB To Establish Task Force on ClimateRelated Financial Disclosures (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.fsb.org/20 15/12/fsb-to-establish-taskforce-on-climate-related-financial-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/E98H-MRF3]. Composed of the
G20 members' national banks, the International Monetary Fund, and The World Bank, among
other high-profile financial institutions, the Financial Stability Board seeks to promote
international financial stability by coordinating national financial authorities and international
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turn, created the industry-led Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures instructed to "develop voluntary, consistent climate-related
financial risk disclosures for use by companies in providing information to
lenders, insurers, investors and other stakeholders." 6 6 Following a process of
stakeholder engagement and consultation, the Task Force released its final
recommendations in June 2017, urging companies to make climate-related
disclosures in their "mainstream (i.e., public) annual financial filings." 7
Substantively, the Task Force recommended that companies disclose their
climate-related governance; the impacts of climate change on their business,
strategy, and financial planning; their approach to managing climate risk; and
the underlying metrics used to assess and manage relevant climate-related
risks and opportunities. 68 To help companies evaluate their resilience to
climate change in the face of uncertainty, the recommendations encourage
organizations to analyze (and disclose) their exposure to climate risk along a
range of potential global warming scenarios. 69
The Task Force's recommendations have been well received. By early
2020, more than 1000 global organizations had declared their support for the
Task Force and its recommendations. 70 Hailing from 55 different countries,
supporters include national governments, government ministries, central
banks, regulators, stock exchanges and credit rating agencies, as well as
nearly 500 financial firms managing assets worth some $140 trillion.7 ' By
comparison, the recommendations' direct targets have been slow to declare
their love, with corporate supporters of the recommendations totaling less
than $12 trillion in market capitalization.72
The tepid corporate response to the recommendations reveals a deeper
agency problem.73 Investors, including the hundreds of financial firms
standard-setting bodies. See also About the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BD., https://www.fsb.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/35C9-XQFA].
66. Press Release 91/2015, Fin. Stability Bd., supra note 65; see also About Us,
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/7453U5VA] (discussing a similarly framed effort to improve the quality and consistency of
environmental risk disclosure).
67.
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 1, 17

(2017).
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 25.
70. See Press Release, Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, supra note 15.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Mahoney, supra note 51, at 1048 (highlighting the "ubiquity and importance" of
agency problems in corporate law and acknowledging disclosure as to reduce the cost of
monitoring managers' use of corporate assets for self-interested purposes); see also Gabriel
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supporting the Task Force's work, crave better information on how
companies assess and manage climate-related risk.7 4 In a recent survey of
institutional investors, the majority of respondents rated climate- related risk
reporting as important as traditional financial reporting, while nearly one
third of investors considered climate reporting to be even more important.75
But companies are reluctant to share that information.
For its latest status report, the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures reviewed the financial reporting of over 1,700 companies
spanning 69 countries and 8 industries.76 While the Task Force notes an
increase in climate-related disclosures since 2016, the report criticizes that
the overall percentage of companies disclosing climate-related information
remains low. 7 Another survey of the world's 2,500 largest companies reports
over one third of companies failing to make any disclosures of climate-related
risk.78
Importantly, even those companies that issue disclosures might do little to
help investors and other stakeholders assess the company's sensitivity to
threats and opportunities resulting from global climate change. In its 2020
status report, the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
lamented that only one in 15 companies disclosed information on the
resilience of its strategy based on various global warming scenarios. 79 Others
criticize the growing trend to disclose climate-related information in "vague
boilerplate terms that are unhelpful to investors who seek a serious evaluation

Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075-83 (2017) (offering an
insightful account of one such self-interested use and resulting agency problems).
74. See, e.g., Gabriel T. Rubin, Show Us Your Climate Risks, Investors Tell Companies,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/show-us-your-climate-risks-investorstell-companies-11551349800 [https://perma.cc/5YP2-XA4F]; Ans Kolk et al., Corporate
Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and Commensuration of

Carbon Disclosure, 17 EuR. ACCT. REV. 719, 720-21 (2008) ("[B]usiness is under increasing
pressure from investors and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to disclose
information related to their GHG emissions.").
75.
Emirhan Ilhan et al., Institutional Investors' Views and Preferences on Climate Risk
Disclosure,EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. 1, 4 (2019).
76.

TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FIN. STABILITY BD., 2020

STATUS REPORT 1, 9 (2020).

77. Id. at 8 ("Disclosure of climate-related financial information ... increased, on average,
. . by six percentage points between 2017 and 2019. However, companies' disclosure of the
potential financial impact of climate change on their businesses, strategies, and financial planning
is low.").
78. See TRUCOST ESG, supra note 16, at 2.
79.

See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, supra note 76, at 12

(criticizing that disclosures are made primarily in sustainability reports, rather than in financial
filings or annual reports).
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of the risks posed by a shifting climate."8 0 According to a recent survey by
McKinsey & Company, "[I]nvestors say they cannot readily use companies'
sustainability disclosures to inform investment decisions ... ."8" Specifically,
investors demand more and better disclosure of climate-related and other
sustainability information that are material to the company's financial
performance. 82
There is cause for cautious optimism. In November 2021, the Technical
Readiness Working Group that unites the Task Force on Climate-Related
Financial Disclosures with other standard-setting organizations from around
the world published prototypical reporting standards for corporate climate
and sustainability disclosures. 83 The Task Force's persistent activism appears
to have stirred the pot sufficiently to place climate-related disclosure on the
agenda of financial regulators and policymakers around the world. The Bank
of England, for example, plans to use its 2021 biennial exploratory scenario
to conduct a climate stress test for banks, insurers, and the financial system. 84
The European Union recently reached political consensus among the
European Parliament and the E.U. Member States on new rules for disclosure
requirements related to sustainability risks, including those related to climate
change.8 5 In its latest financial system review, the Bank of Canada added
80. Wasim, supra note 6, at 1334 & n. 115 (citing the example of Molson Coors Brewing
Company informing investors via its 2015 10-K report that "climate change and water availability
may negatively affect our business and financial results"); see also Irene Monasterolo et al.,
Vulnerable Yet Relevant: The Two Dimensions of Climate-RelatedFinancialDisclosure, 145
CLIMACTIC CHANGE 495, 495 (2017) ("[T]he current lack of concise and comparable measures of
portfolios' exposure to climate risk fails to provide major investors with the full incentives to
reallocate their portfolios.").
81. Sara Bernow et al., More than Values: The Value-Based SustainabilityReporting that
Investors Want, MCKINSEY & CO. 1, 2 (July 2019); see also Christine Robinson et al.,
SustainabilityDisclosure Goes Mainstream,DELOITTE: HEADS UP, Sept. 24, 2019, at 1, 3 (noting
that the lack of standardized investor-grade information prevents integration of climate and other
sustainability information into the decision-making process).
82. Bernow et al., supra note 81, at 5.
83.

See TECH. READINESS WORKING GRP., IFRS FOUND., CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES

PROTOTYPE (2021), https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/groups/trwg/trwg-climate-relateddisclosures-prototype.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8LC-DUQK].
84.

RISKS

See BANK OF ENG., THE 2021 BIENNIAL EXPLORATORY SCENARIO ON THE FINANCIAL

FROM

CLIMATE

CHANGE:

A

DISCUSSION

PAPER

1

(2019),

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2019/biennial-exploratory-scenario-climate-changediscussion-paper [https://perma.cc/X56U-DMCN]; Key Elements of the 2021 Biennial
Exploratory Scenario: FinancialRisks from Climate Change, BANK OF ENG. (June 8, 2021),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/stress-testing/2021/key-elements-2021-biennial-exploratoryscenario-financial-risks-climate-change [https://perma.cc/BL2Z-DP32].
85. See Johannes Bahrke & Letizia Lupini, Capital Markets Union: Commission Welcomes
Agreement on Sustainable Investment Disclosure Rules, EUR. COMM'N (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1571
[https://perma.cc/S8PD5ADF].
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climate change to its list of key economic risks facing the country's financial
system. 86 Earlier this year, the government of New Zealand introduced
legislation to make climate-related disclosures mandatory for certain
companies.8 7
In the United States, legislation on climate-related disclosures has yet to
materialize. The Climate Disclosure Act of 2019, championed by Senator
Elizabeth Warren, sought to require issuers of securities to annually disclose
information regarding climate change-related risks, including their strategies
and actions to mitigate these risks, but died in committee.8 8 The 2021
Corporate Governance Improvement and Investor Protection Act, requiring
disclosure of certain environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics,
passed the House of Representatives but its approval by the Senate is
doubtful. 89 Absent new legislation, climate-related disclosures remain subject
to the generic standard of "materiality" that the Supreme Court established
more than 30 years ago. 90 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Court ruled that
federal securities law requires publicly traded companies to disclose material
facts. 9 1 The Court went on to clarify that, to satisfy its materiality standard,
"there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 92 Considering the high
stakes, the deliberately open-ended Levinson standard, and the evolving
profile of the "reasonable investor," 93 it comes as no surprise that the Supreme
Court's materiality test is heavily debated and litigated. 94 The resulting legal

86.

See STEPHEN S. POLOZ ET AL., BANK OF CAN., FINANCIAL SYSTEM REVIEW SUMMARY-

2019, at 1, 28-30 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/K5K3-PC26].

https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/fsr-summary-2019/

87. Mandatory Climate-Related Disclosures, MINISTRY OF BUS., INNOVATION & EMP.,
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/business/regulating-entities/mandatoryclimate-related-disclosures/ (last updated May 25, 2021).
88. Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. § 5(2) (2020); see also
Climate Change Financial Risk Act of 2019, S. 2903, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to require
financial institutions to conduct climate-risk management by scenario analysis).
89. Corporate Governance Improvement and Investor Protection Act of 2021, H.R. 1187,
117th Cong. (2021).
90. See EVA Su & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11307, CLIMATE-RELATED
RISK DISCLOSURE UNDER U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 1 (2019).
91. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
92. Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
93. See id. at 240 ("[M]ateriality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would
place on the withheld or misrepresented information."). As investors increasingly consider
climate and other sustainability risk in their decision-making, some urge a rethinking of the
"reasonable investor's" profile. See Wasim, supra note 6, at 1336-38.
94.

See Jeffrey A. Smith et al., The SEC's Interpretive Release on Climate Change

Disclosure, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 147, 148 (2010).
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uncertainty, exacerbated by the lack of leadership from the SEC, 95 harms
companies and investors alike. To be clear, uncertainty has not stopped
plaintiffs from suing publicly traded companies for failing to disclose or
misrepresenting their climate-related risk. But most such suits are filed under
state law, not federal law. 96
Taking stock, the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures
deserves great credit for drawing widespread attention to important issues
surrounding the financial reporting and disclosure of climate risk. Empirical
evidence, however, suggests that corporate reporting practices are slow to
change as financial regulators hesitate to turn the Task Force's
recommendations into legal requirements. Even the minority of companies
that include climate-related information in their financial reporting rarely do
so in the decision-useful format promoted by the Task Force. 97 Investors,
asset managers, and other stakeholders will likely have to wait a while longer
before they can base their investment choices on precise and reliable climaterelated disclosures. In the meantime, capital flows freely in the wrong
direction and emissions continue to rise, exacerbating global climate
change. 98 Already, experts worry that "the time required for the [Task
Force's] framework to mature to a point necessary to produce the consistent,
quality information required to effectively drive both market and firm
behaviour will exceed the short time society has to act to mitigate the worst
impacts of climate change." 99

B. ShareholderActivism: Climate Action 100+
Climate activists secured a landmark victory at Chevron's 2020 annual
meeting when 53% of voting shareholders supported a resolution calling on
the oil giant to align its climate-policy lobbying-both directly and indirectly
95.

See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 61 and accompanying text; Peter Reali et al.,

2020 Proxy Season Preview, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 27, 2020),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/27/2020-proxy-season-preview/
[https://perma.cc/S4AT-FP8V] ("[T]he U.S. lags its global peers, and policy changes recently
enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) will likely create new impediments
for shareholders, specifically investors, focused on ESG initiatives.").
96. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 462 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D. Mass. 2020)
(suing under Massachusetts' Consumer Protection Act); People by James v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
119 N.Y.S.3d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (suing, unsuccessfully, under New York's Martin Act).
But see Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 839 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (suing under
the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
97. See generally TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, supra note 4, at 1,
3, 76 (explaining the decision-useful format).
98. See Statement from Robert B. Litterman, supra note 11, at 1.
99. Edwards et al., supra note 17, at 589.
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'

through membership in trade associations-with the Paris Climate
Agreement's goal of keeping global warming under two degrees Celsius.' 00
Chevron is not the first oil and gas major to succumb to mounting shareholder
pressure on climate issues. In December 2018, Royal Dutch Shell issued a
joint statement with investors announcing emissions reduction targets of 20%
by 2035 and 50% by 2050 to decrease the company's net carbon footprint,
including emissions from the sale of its products.' 0
Shareholder climate activism has been on the rise since the 2017 proxy
season. 0 2 The year 2018 witnessed a series of successful shareholder
resolutions, including two requiring fossil fuel heavyweights Kinder Morgan
and Anadarko Petroleum to report on their preparations for a two degree
Celsius scenario. 03 The number of environmental and social shareholder
proposals, including those related to climate change, have steadily grown
from 44% in 2016 to 66% of all proposals in 2020.104 With mounting public
pressure and climate activism gaining momentum on Wall Street, more and
more resolutions do not even go to a vote but end up being withdrawn
following board acquiescence to shareholder demands instead.10 5 Many of
these climate-related shareholder proposals originate with Climate Action
100+.
In late 2017, at the two-year anniversary of the Paris Climate Agreement,
some 200 institutional investors joined forces to launch Climate Action
100+.106 As of late 2021, the initiative unites some 615 investors managing
100. See Rachel Koning Beals, ForFirstTime Ever, Majority of ShareholdersPush Oil Giant
Chevron To Align with Paris Climate Pact, MARKETWATCH (June 24, 2020),
https ://www.marketwatch.com/story/for-first-time-ever-majority-of-shareholders-push-oilgiant-chevron-to-align-with-paris-climate-pact-2020-06-23
[https://perma.cc/QME8-D5WV];
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adoptedDec.
12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (explaining that following ratification by 55 countries accounting
for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions, the Paris Agreement entered into force on
November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption).
101. See Joint Statement Between Institutional Investors on Behalf of Climate Action 100+
and Royal Dutch Shell PLC 1, 2 (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-mediareleases/20 1 8/joint-statement-between-institutional-investors-on-behalf-of-climate-action-andshell/_jcr content/par/textimage dO10.stream/1543782013771/767edfadfd44dO1e425d68a17fd
5alfd24f4f32b/03-dec-2018-joint-statement-institutional-investors-and-shell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8S2U-2W84].
102. See James R. Copland & Margaret O'Keefe, Climate-Change Proposals Break
Through, PROXY MONITOR (2017), https://www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/2017Findingl.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7HFD-RCYW].
103. Westcott, supra note 19.
104. Reali et al., supra note 95.
105. Condon, supra note 20, at 4.
106. Sarah Rundell, Investors Launch ClimateAction 100+, TOP1000FUNDS.COM (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.top1000funds.com/2017/12/investors-launch-climate-action-100/
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assets worth over $60 trillion in their commitment to engage companies to
curb emissions, improve governance, and strengthen climate-related
disclosures.1 07 Members include Harvard University Endowment and other
university endowments; some of the world's largest pension funds, such as
those of California, Japan, and the Netherlands; as well as many of the most
influential non-pension institutional investors, including BlackRock, BNP
Paribas, HSBC, and JPMorgan.'08
Since its inception, Climate Action 100+ has targeted systemically
important greenhouse gas emitters and other companies across the global
economy that have significant opportunities to drive the clean energy
transition and help achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement.1 09 In 2018, the
initial list of 100 target companies, representing up to two-thirds of global
industrial greenhouse gas emissions, was complemented by a second "+" list
adding another 61 companies, identified based on their risk exposure to and
their potential to help mitigate climate change."O In addition to shareholder
resolutions, the members of Climate Action 100+ seek to engage target
companies through one-on-one meetings, investor roundtables, and other
informal channels."' In its 2020 Progress Report, Climate Action 100+
claims credit for emissions reduction commitments from dozens of highprofile multinationals, including ArcelorMittal, British Petroleum, Cemex,
Duke Energy, Ford Motor Company, PetroChina, Qantas Airways, and
Unilever." 2
Shareholder activism has been a fixture of U.S. corporate governance
since 1942, when the SEC adopted Rule 14a-8, requiring companies to put
shareholder resolutions to a vote. "' Pension funds and other institutional
investors have been active participants in the governance of their holdings

[https://perma.cc/N6Q7-VYXT]. A similar initiative with overlapping membership launched in
late 2020 with the stated objective "to galvanise the asset management industry to commit to a
goal
of
net
zero
emissions."
NET
ZERO
ASSET
MANAGERS
INITIATIVE,
https://www.netzeroassetmanagers.org/ [https://perma.cc/D7NH-79CP].
107. About
Climate
Action
100+,
CLIMATE
ACTION
100+,
http://www.climateaction100.org/about [https://perma.cc/FD6P-UDAG].
108. See
Investor
Signatories,
CLIMATE
ACTION
100+,
http://www.climateactionlOO.org/whos-involved/investors/ [https://perma.cc/WM9P-PLC3].
109. See Companies, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, http://www.climateactionlOO.org/whosinvolved/companies/ [https://perma.cc/4B47-KSHM].
110. See
How
We
Got
Here,
CLIMATE
ACTION
100+,
https://www.climateactionlOO.org/approach/how-we-got-here/ [https://perma.cc/J456-JQKV].
111. CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 2019 PROGRESS REPORT 1, 15 (2019).

112. See CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 2020 PROGRESS REPORT, 1, 7, 24, 32, 70, 79, 80 (2020).
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1942).
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since the 1980s." 4 The latest wave of climate-related activism, however,
differs from previous iterations in both its unprecedented rate of success and
the shareholders' underlying motivation.
Historically, shareholder resolutions related to climate change and the
environment more generally have stood out primarily for their "[d]ismal
passage rates.""5 Prior to 1975, most environmentally oriented shareholder
proposals failed to receive even the minimum 3% of votes required for a
proposal to be refiled the following year." 61 The twelve climate-related
proposals voted on during the 2001 and 2002 proxy seasons received, on
average, less than 15% of votes."' In light of these humble beginnings, the
recent successes of climate shareholder activism, with some resolutions
receiving nearly 6 0 % of votes, is all the more impressive."'
The boost in shareholder support for climate-related proposals is likely the
product of a variety of factors, including the heightened sense of urgency
brought about by more frequent and more severe extreme weather events
caused by global climate change.119 In a recent article, Professor Madison
Condon makes a compelling case that another, underappreciated driver of
shareholders' newfound love for climate activism may be a paradigm shift in
the approach of institutional investors to corporate governance. 20
114. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and
ShareholderActivism: The Role ofInstitutionalInvestors, 57 J. OF FIN. ECON. 275, 278-79 (2000);

for a snapshot of the challenges and controversies surrounding the rise of shareholder activism by
institutional investors, see also Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise oflnstitutionalInvestorVoice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); John C. Coffee
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L.

REV. 1277 (1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of CorporateGovernance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019).
115. Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics:
CorporateDisclosuresofClimate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1157, 1160 (2009).
116. Emma SjLstrm, ShareholderActivism for Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do
We Know?, 16 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 141, 145 (2008).
117. See Anastasia O'Rourke, A New Politics of Engagement: Shareholder Activism for
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 12 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV'T 227, 230 (2003).
118. See, e.g., Westcott, supra note 19 (highlighting the 59.7% approval rate of a shareholder
resolution at Kinder Morgan's annual meeting, calling on the company to report on its
preparations for a two-degree Celsius scenario).
119. See BEVERE ET AL., supra note 2 and accompanying text; EMILIO GRANADOS FRANCO
ET AL., WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 6 (2020) ("Climate change is striking harder
and more rapidly than many expected.").
120. See Condon, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that the climate activism of institutional
investors is motivated by their desire to protect economy-mirroring portfolios from the risks and
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The traditional account of shareholder activism suggests that institutional
investors flex their muscles on environmental issues for one of two reasons:
they want to either (a) impose social norms they or their constituents hold
dear, at the possible expense of firm profitability"' or (b) increase firm profits
by remedying a flaw in the managers' business and regulatory strategy.' The
latest rounds of shareholder climate activism suggest that the traditional
account requires amendment to incorporate a third possible reason-the goal
of maximizing profits "at a portfolio rather than afirm level."'23
Following the tenet of modern portfolio theory,' most institutional
investors have diversified their assets broadly across the stock market in an
attempt to mirror the economy. 2 5 As "universal owners," Professor Condon
persuasively argues, these investors have a strong financial incentive to
advance corporate governance that will "mitigate climate change risks and
damages to their economy-mirroring portfolios"-even if this climate
activism hurts the bottom line of individual firms in their investment
portfolio.' 2 6 A recent statement from over seventy institutional investors
managing assets worth over $4.5 trillion lends empirical support to this new,
portfolio-oriented paradigm of shareholder climate activism.' In their
statement, signatory investors call on investee companies to align their

damages of climate change). For an account of the enabling phenomenon of horizontal
shareholding, see Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016);
Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. 1179 (2020) (discussing the related
proliferation of directors serving on multiple corporate boards).
121.

See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, SacrificingCorporateProfits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 733, 759 (2005) (pointing out that "corporations that sacrifice profits to comply with
social and moral norms" tend to have their stock prices driven down even by sympathetic
investors).
122. See, e.g., John Byrd & Elizabeth S. Cooperman, Shareholder Activism for Stranded
Asset Risk: An Analysis of Investor Reactions for Fossil Fuel Companies, INT'L REv. ACCT.,
BANKING & FIN., Spring 2017, at 60 (suggesting the possibility of a carbon bubble due to board
overvaluation of fossil fuel stocks in light of unburnable reserves and other stranded assets).
123. Condon, supra note 20, at 5.
124. See generally Harry Markovitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (establishing the
theoretical framework for portfolio diversification as a means of reducing variance and, thus,
risk). See also Mark Rubinstein, Markowitz's "PortfolioSelection ": A Fifty-Year Retrospective,
57 J. FIN. 1041, 1042 (2002) ("Through diversification, risk can be reduced (but not generally
eliminated) without changing expected portfolio return.").
125. See Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the "Right" Investors: Evidence on the

Behavior ofInstitutionalInvestors, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2020, at 29, 31 (classifying 61%
of institutional investors as "quasi-indexers" that hold broadly diversified investment portfolios
with little turnover, "similar to an index strategy").
126. Condon, supra note 20, at 5-6.
127. See SEAN ALLEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., CONVERGING ON CLIMATE
LOBBYING: ALIGNING CORPORATE PRACTICE WITH INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS 8 (2018).
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lobbying and policy engagement with the goal of a safe climate to protect
"the long-term value in our portfolios across all sectors and asset classes."128
Recognizing financial motives, rather than social norms, as the driving
force behind the recent surge in shareholder climate activism has important
implications. From a doctrinal perspective, the objective of maximizing
profits at the portfolio level explains why institutional investors are
overcoming their historical reluctance to take a more active role in the
governance of their portfolio companies. According to the literature's
traditional narrative, institutional investors are deterred from greater activism
by the agency costs they would absorb, while any benefits would spill over
to all of the target company's shareholders.1 29 When the prospective gains of
climate activism are considered at the portfolio level, however, accruing
across a multitude of holdings for diversified investors, they are much more
likely to outweigh the costs of shareholder stewardship.
This profit rationale behind institutional investors' climate activism bodes
well for the movement's longevity. Boards and directors change, along with
the political beliefs and social norms they hold dear, yet the corporate
objective of profit maximization remains. But the underlying cost-benefit
calculus is firm- and portfolio-specific and subject to change, casting doubt
on the ability of Climate Action 100+ and similar initiatives to scale.
It is easy to see why shareholder activism pushing climate policy at top
emitters like ExxonMobil and Chevron jointly responsible for a staggering
3.3% of global greenhouse gas emissions 30 -pays enough dividends for the
climate-sensitive holdings in an investor's portfolio to outweigh the attendant
agency costs.131 But what happens after fossil fuel majors succumb to
shareholder pressure and restructure their business, selling off some of their
contested upstream operations? So long as there is strong global demand for
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Agency Problems ofInstitutionalInvestors, 31 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 89, 90 (2017) (noting that institutional investor activists generally capture only a small
fraction of the benefits flowing from their activism while bearing the full costs); Edward B. Rock,
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of InstitutionalShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445,

452 (1991) ("What interferes with the realization of the optimists' hope the hope that
institutional investors will be as active, informed, and skeptical as individuals holding an
equivalent stake are the agency costs.").
130. See PAUL GRIFFIN, THE CARBON MAJORS DATABASE: CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 14

(2017).
131. Drawing on Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus's acclaimed modeling of climate
change's economic impacts, Professor Condon offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation for
BlackRock's cost-benefit analysis, pitting firm-level losses of $6 billion from forcing emissions
reductions by Exxon and Chevron against $10 billion in damages from climate change that these
emission reductions would avert from the remainder of BlackRock's portfolio. See Condon, supra
note 20, at 46-47.

53.1209]

CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS

1233

oil, gas, and other fossil fuels, competitive markets will find buyers for these
assets.1 32 Only now ownership of these oil and gas wells or coal mines is no
longer concentrated in the hands of a few, heavily scrutinized corporate giants
but, rather, spread across a multitude of smaller-sized ventures. Aggregate
emissions from these assets may not have changed but the individual carbon
footprint of their corporate owners is significantly smaller. As a result, the
costs of a shareholder activist campaign have increased, relative to their
purported emissions reductions, and may no longer be outweighed by the
benefits, even when measured at portfolio scale.1 33
This hypothetical illustrates another, related challenge for scaling climate
activism based on financial motives. Even without ownership dispersion, the
cost-benefit calculus of climate activism will become less appealing as
investors continue to work through the list of Climate Action 100+ target
companies. The costs of engagement will remain roughly the same but
engaging companies with smaller carbon footprints that promise lower
emissions reductions translates to fewer benefits for institutional investors'
portfolio companies.
A less extreme, but no less likely, scenario is that the momentum of
shareholder climate activism slows down, perhaps as a function of targeting
less and less controversial companies. The 2020 proxy season, for example,
did not deliver nearly the same success as previous years for resolutions
sponsored by Climate Action 100+.134 Proposals requesting that companies
separate the roles of CEO and board chair to drive the strategic transformation
to succeed in a carbon-constrained world failed at Dominion Energy, 3 5 Duke
Energy,1 36 ExxonMobil,1 37 and Southern Company, the latter receiving less

132. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (describing the liquidity of fossil fuel
markets).
133. For an illustrative account of institutional investors' sensitivity to agency costs in the
context of corporate governance, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism:Activist Investors and the Revaluation of GovernanceRights, 113 COLuM. L.

REV. 863 (2013).
134. See
2020
Score
Card,
PROXY
MONITOR,
https://www.proxymonitor.org/ScoreCard2020.aspx [https://perma.cc/P4UF-X828].
135. See
Separate
Chair/CEO
(D,
2020
Resolution),
CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0l lHOOOOCiulOQAR
[https://perma.cc/JF5P-NQ6B].
136. See
Separate
Chair/CEO
(DUK,
2020
Resolution),
CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=a0 1H00000Ciu1JQAR
[https://perma.cc/ESL5-TLKF].
137. See
Separate
Chair/CEO
(XOM,
2020
Resolution),
CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceresengagementdetailpage?recID=a0l 1H00000BZKMHQA5
[https://perma.cc/WT67-ZSC7].
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than a quarter of votes.1 38 Lobbying-related resolutions fared only slightly
better, with majority support at Chevron's annual meeting but rejections from
the shareholders of Caterpillar, Duke Energy, ExxonMobil, Delta Airlines,
United Airlines, General Motors, and Ford Motor Company, the latter
earning barely 20% of votes.1 39 Time will tell to what extent this loss of
momentum was a temporary symptom of the COVID-19 pandemic and
whether success rates are poised to pick up again for shareholder climate
activism.1 4 0 A one-in-twelve ratio of success is all but certain to affect the
expectation value that institutional investors assign to climate activism going
forward.141 Once that expectation value falls below the costs of engagement,
institutional investors may increasingly revert back to their old "rationally
reticent" position on shareholder activism.1 42 Such a reversal back to more
passive shareholding is especially likely for trustees of federally regulated
pension funds and other asset managers whose fiduciary duties require a
reasonable expectation that their engagement will enhance the value of their
investment stake, net of attendant costs.1 4 3

138. See
Separate
Chair/CEO
(SO,
2020
Resolution),
CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceres_engagementdetailpage?recID=aOl 1HOOOOOCiuTQAR
[https://perma.cc/24LC-UAUY].
139. See Climate Action 100+ Investor Signatories Achieve Major Gains During 2020 U.S.

Proxy Season, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://www.climateactionl00.org/news/climate-action100-investor-signatories-achieve-major-gains-during-2020-u-s-proxy-season-2/
[https://perma.cc/R772-ZU3X]; Report on Lobbying (F, 2020 Resolution), CERES,
https://engagements.ceres.org/ceresengagementdetailpage?recID=a01 1H00000BZQXiQAP
[https://perma.cc/UR6J-7YP4].
140. At the time of writing, the 2021 proxy season was in full flight, with preliminary results
offering inconclusive evidence. For example, climate-related shareholder resolutions passed at
Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Delta Airlines, and United Airlines but failed to garner a majority of
votes at Berkshire Hathaway, United Parcel Service, Xcel Energy, and Wal-Mart. See 2021 Score
Card,
PROXY
MONITOR,
https://www.proxymonitor.org/ScoreCard2021.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LVY4-4CLY].
141. We use the term "success" here in reference to the vote on a specific shareholder
proposal related to climate risk and governance but acknowledge that proposals may change
corporate policy even without formal adoption at a company's annual meeting. See, e.g., Yonca
Ertimur et al., Board of Directors'Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder
Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 54 (2010) (presenting evidence that some 40% of shareholder
proposals were later adopted by boards, despite having failed to garner majority approval at the
annual meeting); see also Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2391 (2009) (finding
that, while directors are rarely removed by voting, low vote totals tend to reduce CEO
compensation and increase turnover).
142. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 133, at 867.
143. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling FiduciaryDuty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics ofESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REv. 381, 44448 (2020) (explaining the limits that trust law imposes on a trustee's shareholder activism based
on climate-related and other environmental factors).
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C. The Movement for FossilFuelDivestment
In 2014, Stanford University made global headlines with the decision to
divest its multi-billion-dollar endowment of all stock in coal-mining
companies, citing coal's contribution to global climate change as motivation
for the purge.1 4 4 Stanford was the first major university to join a movement
launched in late 2012 with the "Do the Math" campaign of climate activist
Bill McKibben's 350.org platform.1 4 5 From its humble roadshow beginnings,
the campaign for divestment of fossil fuels has grown into a global
movement, joined by a wide range of name-brand institutional investors,
including pension funds,1 46 sovereign wealth funds,1 47 philanthropic
foundations,1 48 educational institutions,1 49 and faith-based organizations. 50
As of October 2021, more than 1,300 such institutional investors representing

144. See Michael Wines, Stanford To Purge $18 Billion Endowment of Coal Stock, N.Y.
TIMES (May 6, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1kUEGpI [https://perma.cc/7YLT-SQTM]; Ed Crooks,
Stanford Endowment Votes To Sell Coal Mining Shares, FIN. TIMES (May 6, 2014),

https://www.ft.com/content/7259b7ec-d566-11e3-adec-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/ZUQ8P89X].
145. The math in McKibben's call to action was based on the insight that limiting global
warming to acceptable levels would require burning no more than one-fifth of the then-known
fossil fuel reserves. See Do the Math Tour: We're Jumpstartinga New Movement, and We Need
Your Help, 350.ORG, https://math.350.org [https://perma.cc/9ZA7-F7H2].
146. See, e.g., Jamie Smyth, Australian Pension FundLGS Drops Coal Assets, FIN. TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/20d5alae-4dd1-11e4-9683-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/LKF5-5WWF]; Madison Marriage, Norway's Largest Pension Fund Vows To
Drop Coal Mine Holdings, FIN. TES (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/ab7b785e716e-11e4-bl78-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/VA6V-DSLM]; Charles Daly, Sweden's $37
Billion API Pension Fund Divests from Fossil Fuels, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03 -16/sweden-s-37-billion-ap 1-pension-funddivests-from-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/7CER-D2QE].
147. See, e.g., Rob Davies, Norway's $ltn Wealth Fund To Divest from Oil and Gas
Exploration,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/08/norways- ltn-wealth-fund-to-divest-from-oiland-gas-exploration [https://perma.cc/VTE3-E8SD].
148. See, e.g., Michael Calia, Rockefeller Fund Seeks To Shed Fossil-Fuel Investments,

WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rockefeller-fund-seeks-to-shedfossil-fuel-investments-1411398675 [https://perma.cc/5XDQ-7343] (noting the irony that the
Rockefellers' fortune was built largely on oil investments).
149. See, e.g., Libby Brooks, Glasgow Becomes First University in Europe To Divest from

Fossil
Fuels,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
8,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/08/glasgow-becomes-first-university-ineurope-to-divest-from-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/C8ZL-NV5H].
150. See, e.g., Adam Vaughan,

World Council of Churches Rules Out Fossil Fuel

Investments,
GUARDIAN
(July
11,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/i 1/world-council-of-churches-pulls-fossilfuel-investments [https://perma.cc/YE8F-UDSF].
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close to $15 trillion in capital around the world have committed to divestment
of some, if not all, of their fossil fuel holdings.' 5
But the divestment movement is not uncontroversial. Critics such as
Microsoft founder and noted philanthropist Bill Gates question the net effect
of divestment on carbon emissions: "Divestment, to date, probably has
reduced about zero tones of emissions. It's not like you've capital-starved the
people making steel and gasoline." 5 2 The scholarly community has voiced
similar concerns over the impact of divestment on the valuation of affected
stocks, noting that the size of the global financial market and the liquidity of
most fossil fuel stocks help any divested holdings quickly find their way to
other, less concerned investors.1 53 Others criticize that the divestment
movement's focus on extractive and energy companies, while mediaeffective, fails to recognize the systemic, economy-wide interconnections
from supply to consumption-that shape overall greenhouse gas emissions.1
Such a myopic approach, critics contend, misrepresents the complex pushand-pull dynamic across the value chain of energy and other carbon-relevant
products or services.
Many proponents highlight the moral argument underlying divestment
over the movement's actual impact on companies, markets, and emissions.156
151. See 1200+ Divestment Commitments, supra note 23. Some participants limit their
commitment to divestment of a subset of fossil fuel companies, such as the coal industry,
continuing to invest in other fossil assets. See, e.g., supra note 144 and accompanying text
(explaining the Stanford endowment's exit from coal, but not oil and gas).
152. Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson & Billy Nauman, Fossil Fuel Divestment Has 'Zero'
Climate
Impact,
Says
Bill
Gates,
FIN.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/21009elc-d8c9-11e9-8f9b-77216ebelfl7
[https://perma.cc/UQW35GY3].
153. See ANSAR ET AL., supra note 24, at 70; Randall Morck et al., supra note 24, at 207
(contending that "liquidity .. . [is one of] the fundamental determinants of stock values");
Schwarz, supra note 24, at 43 (noting that money divested from fossil fuel companies and
reinvested in banks will very likely end up funding such companies again); Paul Brest et al., How
Investors Can (and Can 't) Create Social Value, 44 J. CORP. L. 205, 210 (2018) (noting that it is
"virtually impossible" for socially conscious investment, and divestment, to affect the "behavior
of firms whose securities trade in public markets"); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 143, at
399 ("[C]apital lost to a firm from a [divestment] strategy employed by even a large number of
[investors] will tend to be replaced by other capital that rushes in to take advantage of the
opportunity."). But see Dordi & Weber, supra note 24, at 11-14 (offering empirical evidence of
short-term depressions in stock prices for fossil fuel companies following divestment events).
154. See Sibylle Braungardt et al., Fossil Fuel Divestment and Climate Change: Reviewing
ContestedArguments, 50 ENERGY RscH. & SOc. SC'. 191, 195 (2019).
155. See id.
156. In the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's announcement to divest, for example, chair Valerie
Rockefeller Wayne stressed the "moral obligation" to withdraw financial support from carbonpolluting industries. Suzanne Goldenberg, Rockefeller Brothers Fund: It Is Our Moral Duty To
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Others view divestment as "a process of delegitimising" the fossil fuel sector
and its "odious profits."15 This morally-informed narrative makes the
divestment movement a "norm entrepreneur" that draws on social norms to
change public perception and opinion, in this case about climate change, its
contributors, and its mitigation.1 58 The moral overtone appears to have struck
a nerve, as evidenced by frequent comparisons to other morally framed
divestment campaigns, such as the anti-Apartheid or tobacco boycotts.1 59
Some commentators acknowledge that the divestment movement has
revitalized the environmental discourse in certain countries, prompting novel
demands from investors and creating new conversations among financiers. 60
Others muse whether the divestment movement can create sufficient public
support to carry international agreements and more effective national climate
policies. 161
Occasional moral victories and a strong media presence notwithstanding,
the divestment movement has failed to convert financial markets into a fullblown battlefield in the war on carbon-due to three critical limitations."2
First, by drawing a binary divestment line between fossil and non-fossil
stocks, the movement fails to properly differentiate among companies-on
both sides of the divide-based on their relative contributions to global
warming and climate change. Second, the movement's focus on institutional
investors ignores the market reality that retail investors control a majority of
equities in the United States and elsewhere. Third, investors receive little, if
any, guidance on how to reinvest funds freed up by divestment of fossil fuel
stocks.
Painting with too broad a brush and lumping all fossil fuel companies
together can produce perverse incentives that impede rather than promote
effective climate action. Consider two competing fossil fuel companies:

from
Fossil
Fuels,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
27,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/27/rockefeller-fund-chairman-moral-dutydivest-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/WXV9-YQMQ].
157. Adam Vaughan, Fossil Fuel Divestment: A Brief History, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/08/fossil-fuel-divestment-a-brief-history
[https://perma.cc/FMV7-AYRC] (citing author and climate activist Naomi Klein).
158. See Braungardt et al., supra note 154, at 192.

Divest

159. See, e.g., Chelsie Hunt et al., A ComparativeAnalysis ofthe Anti-Apartheid and Fossil

Fuel Divestment Campaigns, 7 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 64 (2017).
160. See, e.g., Noam Bergman, Impacts of the Fossil FuelDivestment Movement: Effects on

Finance, Policy and Public Discourse, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 2540 (2018).
161. See Neil Gunningham, Building Normsfrom the GrassrootsUp: Divestment, Expressive

Politics, and Climate Change, 39 L. & POL'Y 372, 387-88 (2017).
162. The critique presented here expands on ideas and arguments first articulated in Felix
Mormann, Why the Divestment Movement Is Missing the Mark, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
1067 (2020).
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Company A adheres to business as usual, using the revenue from its
extractive activities to fund development of new oil and gas wells. Company
B also operates in the upstream oil and gas business but, unlike its competitor,
uses part of its revenue to fund research on biofuels from algae and powers
its operations with electricity from low-carbon renewable sources.1 63 While
stylized, this hypothetical illustrates the industry reality that, when it comes
to emissions and climate change, not all oil companies are created equal.
According to a recent report, Repsol, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total have the
most comprehensive plans for greenhouse gas reduction among oil-and-gas
companies, while also leading the pack in terms of their commitment to
renewables.1 64 Yet, the divestment movement shuns these more emissionssensitive and climate-conscious companies exactly the same as their more
polluting, business-as-usual competitors.
The same lack of differentiation applies to non-fossil fuel companies who
are exempt from divestment, regardless of their relative contribution to the
greenhouse gas emissions that drive global climate change. As stated earlier,
emission-intensive firms are not found only in the fossil fuel and energy
industries. The manufacture and processing of aluminum, for example, is
well known for its enormous energy intensity and, hence, its potential carbon
footprint.1 65 The majority of these carbon emissions typically come from the
electricity required for aluminum electrolysis.' 66 A manufacturer using coalfired electricity would, therefore, emit orders of magnitude more greenhouse
gases than a competitor powered by low-carbon electricity from solar, wind,
or nuclear. Once again, however, the divestment movement would treat both
firms alike and encourage continuing investment in both stocks.
163. If this hypothetical scenario seems far-fetched, see Anna Hirtenstein, ExxonMobil Is
Spending $Ibn a Year Researching Renewable Energy, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/exxonmobil-renewable-energy-researchoil-company-development-biofuels-algae-electricity-a803 5496.html
[https://perma.cc/E5NR-CWNW] (describing ExxonMobil's research commitment to alternative
forms of energy from algae-engineered biofuels to cells that turn emissions into electricity);
Carolyn Fortuna, Should We Cheer? ExxonMobil's Renewable Energy Commitments Are in the
News, CLEANTECHNICA (Dec. 6, 2018), https://cleantechnica.com/2018/12/06/should-we-cheerexxonmobils-renewable-energy-commitments-are-in-the-news/
[https://perma.cc/AUB7-2EUY] (noting the irony of using renewable electricity to extract oil and
gas).
164. See Allen Good, MORNINGSTAR, Understanding the Emissions Challenge: An
Assessment of IntegratedOils' Efforts To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Intensity, STOCK STRATEGIST

INDUS. REPS. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/961748/understanding-theemissions-challenge [https://perma.cc/KKV2-K4H8].
165. See Gautam et al., Carbon Footprint of Aluminum Production: Emissions and
Mitigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL CARBON FOOTPRINTS: INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDIES 197, 197-228

(Subramanian Senthilkannan Muthu ed., 2018).
166. Id. at 207.
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From an asset perspective, therefore, the movement for fossil fuel
divestment can be faulted for being overinclusive relative to fossil fuel assets
and underinclusive as regards other assets. Empirical evidence suggests that
this critique could be extended, at least in part, to the movement's investor
reach. After all, the current divestment tally lists over 1,300 commitments
from institutional investors representing nearly $15 trillion in assets,
compared to fewer than 60,000 commitments from individual investors
barely surpassing $5 billion.1 67 The latter numbers reflect the divestment
movement's failure to mobilize a key contingent of the global financial
market individuals who hold stocks and other securities for their personal
account, commonly referred to as retail investors.
In the United States alone, retail investors directly hold over $16 trillion
of stocks, or 38% of all U.S. equities.1 68 Counting both direct and indirect
stock ownership, through mutual funds, retail investors own nearly 60% of
U.S. equities, for a total value of almost $25 trillion.1 69 And it is not just the
wealthiest 1% who own these stocks. According to the Federal Reserve
Bank's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances, 68 million, or 5 3 %, of U.S.
households own stocks. 70 In light of these numbers, the tiny share of
divestment commitments from retail investors suggests that the movement
fails to engage a key segment of the financial market-one that controls
almost two-thirds of U.S. stocks.' 7 ' This apparent lack of retail investor
mobilization is problematic, both from an asset perspective and for the
divestment movement's stated mission to delegitimize the fossil fuel industry
in the court of public opinion and thereby spur more widespread support for
climate action. 2
The overwhelming focus on institutional investors is further problematic
because it ignores legal barriers to divestment. Asset managers for pension
funds, charitable trusts, and other institutions subject to U.S. trust law, for
example, would likely struggle to reconcile wholesale divestment from fossil
167. See 1200+ Divestment Commitments, supra note 23.
168. See KATIE KOLCHIN, SIFMA, SIFMA INSIGHTS: Q: WHO OWNS STOCKS IN AMERICA?
A: INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 14 (2019).

169. Id. When adding indirect stock ownership through Exchange Traded Funds, the overall
equity holdings of U.S. retail investors rise even further. Id. at 14, 20.
170. See Neil Bhutta et al., Changes in U.S. Family Financesfrom 2016 to 2019: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 106 FED. RSRv. BULL. 18, 40 (2020).

171. These numbers explain why critics worry that divested shares quickly end up in the
hands of other investors without putting much of a dent, if any, into the affected stock's market
price. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
172. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming's Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19,
2012),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/global-warmings-terrifying-newmath-188550/ [https://perma.cc/7USB-6CW3]; see also Braungardt et al., supra note 154, at 19293.
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fuels with their fiduciary duties. 7 3 Outside of special rules for charities and
authorization by the settlor or beneficiary in personal trusts, fossil fuel
divestment would violate the sole interest rule of fiduciary trust law."1 4 That
is because eschewing an entire industry would incur diversification costs
likely to hurt the trust's bottom line." 5 Moreover, the movement's stated goal
of reducing the fossil fuel industry's access to capital, if achieved, would raise
the cost of capital for fossil companies and, therefore, increase the returns
from investing in these assets, turning (socially successful) divestment into a
losing proposition, at least from the trust law-relevant financial
perspective. 7 6 In the 1980s, the same rationale led the majority of
commentators to conclude that trustees seeking to boycott the South African
Apartheid regime could not divest from firms doing business in South Africa
without violating their fiduciary duties."?'
Trust law also explains why Stanford University's endowment divested
from coal, but not from other fossil fuel assets.'7 8 In keeping with their
fiduciary duties, Stanford's Board of Trustees pursue a return-oriented
investment strategy, except for "very rare occasions . . . when companies'
actions or inactions are so abhorrent and ethically unjustifiable as to warrant
the University's dissociation from those investments." 7 9 Having failed to
identify such abhorrent practices among the companies in Stanford's

&

173. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 143, at 398-99, 442 (laying out the difference
between prohibited divestment to produce collateral benefits and potentially permissible
divestment for the sole purpose of increased returns).
174. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, FiduciaryPrinciples in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAw 41, 41-46 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the
demands of the trustee's fiduciary duties and the sole interest rule).
175. See, e.g., Dylan B. Minor, Finding the [Financial] Cost of Socially Responsible
Investing, 16 J. INVESTING 54, 55 (2007).
176. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 143, at 398.
177. See, e.g., Richard M. Ennis & Roberta L. Parkhill, South African Divestment: Social
Responsibility or Fiduciary Folly?, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30, 35-36 (1986) (finding that
divestment from South Africa would violate the exclusive purpose test); John H. Langbein
Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 88, 96 (1980);
Thomas A. Troyer et al., Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implicationsfor
Foundations, Other CharitableInstitutions, andPension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127, 149-50 (1985)

("More traditional trust law principles suggest that a trustee who approves a divestment policy
breaches his or her duty of loyalty because he or she is pursuing an objective extraneous to the
purposes of the trust.").
178. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
179. BD. OF TRS., STAN. UNIV., STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2018),

https://stanford.app.box.com/v/stmt-investment-responsibility [https://perma.cc/NK6R-GWNE].
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portfolio, the Trustees did "not believe that a credible case can be made for
divesting from the fossil fuel industry" more broadly. 8 0
The third and final limitation lies in the movement's focus on divestment
from fossil fuel stocks with little, if any, guidance for investors on how to
reinvest their funds. As Bill Gates and other critics have noted, positive
investment choices that fund innovative, climate-friendly businesses are
likely to have a greater impact on global greenhouse gas emissions than
divestment alone.' 8 ' To be sure, platforms like divestinvest.org seek to guide
those committed to divestment from fossil fuels toward reinvestment in more
climate-friendly assets.8 2 The actual impact of these recommendations,
however, remains unknown.1 83 Moreover, any guidance is, once again,
targeted at institutional investors, leaving retail investors to fend for
themselves.18 4

II.

THE CASE FOR CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS

Disclosure of climate-related financial information, shareholder climate
activism, and the divestment movement each have an important part to play
in the unfolding climate finance saga. But they are unlikely to come close
individually or collectively-in reach and impact to a system of independent
ratings that assess companies' climate risk and governance. This Part makes
the conceptual case for including corporate climate ratings among the
performance metrics that inform investor decision making.18 5
In April 2021, President Biden appointed Gary Gensler as new Chair of
the SEC responding to calls to place the climate crisis at the top of the

180. Press Release, Bd. of Trs., Stan. Univ., Stanford and Climate Change (April 25, 2016),
https://news.stanford.edu/2016/04/25/stanford-climate-change-statement-board-trustees/
[https://perma.cc/86ZM-5N8Y].
181. See Edgecliffe-Johnson & Nauman, supra note 152 (citing Bill Gates' investment in
Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods, two alternative protein companies aiming to reduce the
carbon intensity of burgers and other, traditionally meat-based foods).
182. See
About
Us,
DIVESTINVEST,
https://www.divestinvest.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/BBB5-7CG3].
183. The DivestInvest site offers a list of participating investors and assets for download, but
information is limited to divestment commitments with no actual numbers for participants'
reinvestment choices. See Spreadsheet, DIVESTINVEST, https://www.divestinvest.org/wp[https://perma.cc/2CBFcontent/uploads/2019/08/2019.08.14-DivestInvest-Tally.-External.xlsx
PBAC] (providing download link).
184. See Tom Harrison, How To DivestInvest: A Guide for Institutional Investors,
DIVESTINVEST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.divestinvest.org/guide/ [https://perma.cc/QH49A6AP].
185. For empirical evidence of the capacity of climate ratings to catalyze more climateconscious investor behavior, see infra Part III.
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Commission's agenda.1 86 Sure enough, Wall Street's top watchdog quickly
announced that a new rulemaking proposal for climate-related disclosures
would be released before the year's end.' 87 With the SEC dominated for the
foreseeable future by commissioners appointed during the Trump
administration, ' it remains to be seen how stringent the eventual rule will
be.1 89 Whatever the rule's substantive heft, the bigger question is how long it
will take for the resulting climate disclosure requirements to actually go into
effect. If the Obama administration's ill-fated Clean Power Plan, the last
rulemaking effort of similar importance to climate action, is any indication,
any SEC rule on climate disclosure is likely to face fierce opposition and

186. See Jason Bisnoff, Gary Gensler Confirmed as New SEC Chair as Agency Tackles

GameStop Saga, ESG Boom and Cryptocurrency, FORBES (Apr.
14, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbisnoff/2021/04/14/gary-gensler-confirmed-as-new-secchair-as-agency-tackles-gamestop-saga-esg-boom-and-cryptocurrency/?sh=24e6cbe 16f67
[https://perma.cc/HGZ9-B5N7];see also Andrew Ackerman & Dave Michaels, Biden Is Expected
To Name Gary Gensler for SEC Chairman, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
12, 2021),
https ://www.wsj .com/articles/biden-is-expected-to-name-gary-gensler-for-sec-chairman11610487023 [https://perma.cc/P5KA-BU9C] (citing Senator Elizabeth Warren's demand that
"[w]e need a new SEC chair who will put this climate crisis at the top of the agency's agenda").
187. See Katanga Johnson & Pete Schroeder, U.S. SEC ChairTells Congress He PlansNew
Rules on Climate Risk, Trading, REUTERS (May 6, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/ussec-chair-pledges-trading-rules-review-first-congressional-hearing-2021-05-06/
[https://perma.cc/BB48-6PST].
188. Staggered five-year terms of the five commissioners enable the President to make a new
SEC appointment every year. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
189. The SEC's partisan politics were aptly illustrated earlier this year when Commissioners
Peirce and Roisman issued a public statement to openly criticize then-Acting Chair Alison Herren
Lee's announcement directing the Division of Corporate Finance to enhance its focus on climaterelated disclosure in public company filings. See Hester M. Peirce & Elad L. Roisman, Enhancing
Focus on the SEC's Enhanced Climate Change Efforts, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Mar. 4,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/roisman-peirce-sec-focus-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/4CFM-DDYY]. Opposition to ESG disclosure mandates is not limited to the
SEC's inner circles. The Financial Economists Roundtable, a group of senior financial
economists, recently urged the SEC not to mandate disclosure of a firm's impacts on
environmental and social outcomes. See FIN. ECONOMISTS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON SEC
REGULATION

OF

ESG

ISSUES

2

(Oct.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/ lAe_90xQ9iYJwZ_r8A2-XLptQGqr4nObA/view
[https://perma.cc/AD2L-SRQL].
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become the subject of protracted litigation.1 90 In the interim, precious time
will be lost.' 9
Even if meaningful SEC disclosure requirements for climate-related
information are, indeed, issued and eventually enter into force, their impact
on actual investment and flows of capital remains uncertain. After all, how
many retail, and even institutional, investors go to the trouble of sifting
through the latest SEC filings of the companies whose stock they are
considering for purchase?I 92 Enter corporate climate ratings-a powerful tool
that remedies existing information asymmetries1 93 and nudges investors to
make more climate-conscious choices for the dual benefit of their bottom line
and better environmental stewardship.1 94
190. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60),
implementation stayed until resolution ofpending challenges per West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S.
Ct. 1000 (2016), repealed by Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Andrew Ramonas, SEC Climate Disclosure Push
Brings
Corporate Lobbying
Flood,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(May
25,
2021),
https:/news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-climate-disclosure-push-brings-corporatelobbying-flood?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/HR36-LY2N] (reporting how the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and other skeptics are lobbying the SEC to drop its climate disclosure
agenda).
191. President Biden's Executive Order 14030 on Climate-Related Financial Risk
underscores the urgency of better climate risk disclosure and governance. See 86 Fed. Reg. 27967
(May 20, 2021). A recent follow-up report from the White House calls for a "whole-ofgovernment" effort to address climate-related financial risks to the United States. See THE WHITE
HOUSE,

U.S.

CLIMATE-RELATED RISK EXECUTIVE ORDER 14030: A ROADMAP TO BUILD A

CLIMATE-RESILIENT
ECONOMY
(Oct.
14,
2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/10/Climate-Finance-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U72B-G4FA].
192. According to a recent survey, investors turn to a variety of sources, but not SEC filings,
for their pre-transaction research. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, The Devil You Know: A Survey
Examining How Retail Investors Seek Out and Use FinancialInformation and Investment Advice,

37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 653, 665 (2018).
193. The pervasive information asymmetries on capital markets related to climate change
have been the subject of recent and ongoing litigation over corporations misinforming their
shareholders regarding climate risks. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d
832, 840 (N.D. Tex. 2018); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Att'y Gen., 94 N.E.3d. 786, 790 (Mass. 2018).
194. Similar informational nudges have proven highly effective in a variety of contexts,
including health warnings, restaurant hygiene ratings, and food labels. See, e.g., Geoffrey T. Fong
et al., The Impact of Pictures on the Effectiveness of Tobacco Warnings, 87 BULL. WORLD

HEALTH ORG. 640 (2009) (reporting the positive health impacts of warning graphics and labels
on tobacco packaging); Paul A. Simon et al., Impact of RestaurantHygiene Grade Cards on
Foodborne-DiseaseHospitalizations in Los Angeles County, 67 J. ENv'T HEALTH 32 (2005)
(reporting a 13% decrease in hospitalizations for foodborne illness following the requirement for
restaurants to display their hygiene ratings); Brenna Ellison et al., The Impact of Restaurant
CalorieLabels on Food Choice: Results from a Field Experiment, 52 ECON. INQUIRY 666 (2014)
(reporting evidence of the effectiveness of graphically displayed calorie labels, accompanied by
modeling projections that labels will be more effective at achieving the targeted behavioral change
than either a tax on high-calorie items or a subsidy on low-calorie items).
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Our proposal for rating companies' climate risk and governance expands
upon the well-established system of bond ratings in financial markets. For
over a century, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and other rating agencies have
gathered, analyzed, and translated a wide array of complex information into
a simple, intuitively framed letter-grade rating of creditworthiness for bonds
and companies. 195 Our proposed corporate climate ratings mimic this
approach by gathering and analyzing information related to a company's
greenhouse gas emissions, its management of physical and transitional
climate risks, and its attendant business opportunities. The resulting
company-specific assessments empower investors to include climate-related
risks and opportunities in their decision-making process, to increase the
returns on their investments and help redirect the flow of capital toward more
climate-friendly assets.
A shared methodology with well-established credit ratings familiar to
companies and investors alike lowers the barriers to widespread adoption of
corporate climate ratings on capital markets.1 96 Compared to broadly framed
ratings of corporate performance along environmental, social, and
governance metrics, the greater focus of climate-specific ratings fosters
greater consistency across rating services and, with it, better investor
information.' 97 Unlike most other reform proposals, climate ratings are
attainable in the here and now, without the need for government authorization
or other forms of market-distorting regulatory intervention.' 9 8 Those hoping
for implementation of a federal carbon tax or cap-and-trade regime will
appreciate the capacity of climate ratings to amplify the abatement incentives
provided by carbon pricing policies, in the United States and beyond.1 99 From
a political economy perspective, finally, corporate climate ratings can create
common ground in the increasingly polarized partisan politics surrounding
climate change.2 0 0

A. Building on Ratings of Creditworthiness
Independent ratings of companies and their performance metrics have long
been a staple of financial markets. Every year, rating agencies like Standard
& Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch pass judgment on over $125 trillion worth of

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See HAROLD, supra note 30, at 11.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part IID.
See infra Part IIE.

CORPORATE CLIMATE RATINGS

53.1209]

1245

securities. 20 1 Their ratings, ranging from D (for default) to AAA (best)
determine the access to and cost of capital for corporations, municipalities,
national governments, and, ultimately, their citizenry. 202 In the words of
Senator Joseph Lieberman, "credit raters . . . hold the key to capital and
liquidity, . . . the lifeblood of corporate America and of our capitalist
economy" and thereby "affect stock price."203
Today's rating agencies trace their origins back to the early 1900s, when
industrial expansion increased companies' appetite for capital beyond what
they could raise via the then-prevailing system of relational finance, relying
on local lenders well-acquainted with the corporations they helped fund. 204
When capital needs could no longer be met by this system of trust established
over years, if not decades, of doing business together, third-party ratings
helped fill the resulting knowledge gap.2 05
Since 1973, the role of credit ratings has received growing regulatory
recognition starting with the designation of select rating agencies as
Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations.2 06 The pivotal status
of these agencies has since been cemented via a series of credit ratingdependent rules and regulations promulgated under the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of
1940, and a variety of other banking regulations. 207 In response to market
demand, rating agencies have continued to expand their product offerings
201. The two largest rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, rated a staggering
$126 trillion of securities
in 2019 alone. See What We Do, MOODY'S,
https://about.moodys.io/overview [https://perma.cc/G8WP-A2N3] (reporting over $79 trillion of
rated

debt);

S&P

GLOB.,

2020

INVESTOR

http://investorfactbook.spglobal.com/pdf-downloads/
nearly $47 trillion of rated debt).

FACT

BOOK

16

[https://perma.cc/4N6S-APKB]

(2020),

(reporting

202. See Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the

Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 116 (2002).
203. Id.
204. See HAROLD, supra note 30, at 6; Richard Sylla, An HistoricalPrimer on the Business
of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19

(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002); Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The CreditRatingIndustry,
5 J. FIXED INCOME 10, 10-12 (1995).
205. See TIMOTHY

J.

SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING

AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS 5 (Cornell University Press 2014) ("Rating

serves a purpose in less socially embedded capital markets, where fund managers are under
pressure to demonstrate they are not basing their understanding of creditworthiness of investment
alternatives on implicit trust in names but use a recognized, accepted mechanism.").
206. See Notice of Revision Proposed Amendments to Rule 153-1 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-10,525, 1973 (Nov. 29, 1973) (codified as
amended at17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1).
207. For a detailed discussion of the regulatory recognition of and reliance on credit rating
agencies in financial markets, see Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert ofFinancialMarkets: Two
Thumbs Down for the CreditRatingAgencies, 77 WASHU. L.Q. 619, 645-49 (1999).
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beyond publicly traded debt instruments. By the beginning of the new
millennium, more than three-quarters of industrial companies in the United
States were rated by one or more agencies. 20 Some agencies are showing
signs of interest in potential future incorporation of climate-related risk into
their rating metrics. 209 Even if climate risk eventually becomes part of the
process, however, its precise impact on the overall rating of a bond or
company will remain a mystery to investors, given how zealously agencies
guard their rating methodologies.2 10
In the meantime, a specialized rating system for corporate climate
governance is starting to take shape. The international non-profit CDP,
formerly known as Carbon Disclosure Project, has initiated an annual
reporting process that rates companies' and municipalities' progress and
action on climate change as well as other environmental issues. 2 ' In 2020,
CDP rated over 9,600 companies and 920 cities, states, and regions, awarding
letter grades from A (leadership level), B (management level), C (awareness
level), D (disclosure level) to F (failure to provide sufficient information to
be evaluated).2 " Similar to the letter grades awarded by credit-rating
agencies, corporate climate ratings a la CDP's can convey decision-useful
information in a format familiar to markets and investors. 213
208. See New
Interests,
New
Conflicts,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
14,
2001),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2001/04/12/new-interests-new-conflicts
[https://perma.cc/UMA6-DJX3] (reporting corporate rating coverage of 78% and 66% by
Moody's and Standard & Poor's, respectively).
209. In 2019, Moody's acquired a majority stake in FourTwentySeven, a data provider for
the assessment of climate impact and risk. See Christopher Flavelle, Moody's Buys Climate Data
Firm, Signaling New Scrutiny of Climate Risks, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/climate/moodys-ratings-climate-change-data.html
[https://perma.cc/G27C-XZFY].
210. Credit rating agencies have long been criticized for the "black box" nature of their rating
criteria, with little, if any, gains in transparency. See, e.g., Uk Sinha, Rating Agencies Owe the
Market More Transparency, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2aObffc7e925-4df8-ba9c-2bf9dda579b3 [https://perma.cc/WL2C-8NQB]. For a critical evaluation of
reform proposals for greater transparency, see Claire A. Hill, Why DidRating Agencies Do Such
a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities, 71 U. PITT. L. REv. 585, 602 (2010).
211. What
We
Do,
CDP,
https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/C6Y8-JRB9].
212. Companies Scores, supra note 32 (showing, remarkably, only 273, or less than 3 % of
the over 9,600 companies rated earned an "A" rating for their disclosure and actions on climate
change, further underscoring the need for greater mobilization of capital markets in war on
carbon); see also supra Part I.
213. Closer to Main Street than Wall Street, a similar system of ratings for climate risk is
emerging to help homebuyers assess spatially refined climate risks, such as flooding, extreme
heat, and wildfires, for their real estate objects of desire. See Matthew E. Kahn, A New Rating
Industry Is Emerging To Help Homebuyers Assess Climate Risks, CONVERSATION (Nov. 23,
2021),
https://theconversation.com/a-new-ratings-industry-is-emerging-to-help-homebuyersassess-climate-risks-171898 [https://perma.cc/K4V8-VKAH].
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Rating agencies and their ratings are not exempt from criticism. Disruptive
events on financial markets periodically prompt calls for greater regulatory
oversight and other reforms. 14 Critics have labeled rating agencies as "superpowers" that "can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds."2 15 Others
contend that, based on empirical evidence, rating agencies "do a good, if not
stellar, job." 216 Whatever the correct verdict on the accuracy, transparency,
and power of credit ratings, they provide a helpful blueprint for corporate
climate ratings.2 " The ability to draw on the rich and colorful history of credit
ratings enables CDP and other emerging raters of companies' climate risk
and governance to emulate the best practices of Moody's and company
without the need to replicate their mistakes.
B. The ComparativeBenefits of Climate Ratings Over ESG Ratings
We are not the first to suggest a system of ratings for corporate
performance based on environmental metrics. Over the past decade, growing
investor interest in environmental, social, and governance factors has
produced a flurry of ESG rating services and related investment products.2 18
Today, hundreds of ESG-themed mutual funds and ESG rating services
compete for the attention and money of socially conscious investors. 2 19 But
214. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 210, at 590-93 (discussing the failures of rating agencies that
contributed to the sub-prime mortgage crisis and resulting reform initiatives); Claire A. Hill,
Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH U. L.Q. 43, 82 (2004) (assessing proposals for reform
of the rating industry following public outcry over its failures in the context of the Enron scandal).
215. Thomas L. Friedman, ForeignAffairs; Don 'tMess With Moody's, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/22/opinion/foreign-affairs-don-t-mess-with-moodys.html [https://perma.cc/4CHK-N76X] ("[W]e live again in a two-superpower world. There is the
U.S. and there is Moody's. The U.S. can destroy a country by leveling it with bombs; Moody's
can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds."); see also Paul Krugman, Berating the Raters,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/opinion/26krugman.html
[https://perma.cc/L85E-TRQT] (criticizing the conflicts of interest that undermine the accuracy
and credibility of credit ratings issued in exchange for payment by the issuing entity); Partnoy,
supra note 207, at 623, 681 (criticizing the oligopolistic market power granted to Moody's and
other credit rating agencies through regulatory licenses).
216. Hill, supra note 214, at 44 ("[T]here is considerable evidence that in the normal course,
they [rating agencies] do a good, if not stellar, job.").
217. It is unlikely, at least in the near term, that corporate climate ratings would wield the
same power as credit ratings, especially at a time when not every investor believes in or is
concerned about global warming, sea level rise, and other manifestations of climate change.
218. See, e.g., Betty Moy Huber & Michael Comstock, ESG Reports andRatings: What They
Are, Why They Matter, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOv. (July 27, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/esg-reports-and-ratings-what-they-are-why-theymatter/ [https://perma.cc/VT62-4ALQ] (surveying eight ESG rating companies, while also noting
that there are too many to cover all).
219. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 143, at 431.
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ratings vary dramatically, though not always transparently, in methodology,
scope, and coverage, leaving investors to grapple with confusing, if not
outright conflicting, information.2 20 Compared to ESG metrics and other,
more broadly defined ratings, our proposed climate-focused ratings minimize
the risk of confusing investors with divergent ratings due to methodological
inconsistencies.
Consider the example of Tesla Motors, the world's leading manufacturer
of electric vehicles. Transport electrification has long been identified as a
cornerstone of global strategies to alleviate air pollution, reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, and mitigate climate change."' One might intuit, therefore,
that Tesla would ace at least the environmental component of ESG ratings.22
Sure enough, the ESG index of MSCI, a highly regarded financial
information firm, rates Tesla at the top of the auto industry. 223 At the same
time, however, FTSE, another well-respected ESG rating service, rates
Tesla's environmental performance at "zero," ranking the carmaker behind
Exxon in terms of sustainability.22 4 This striking discrepancy in the
environmental scores awarded by rating services is the result of critical
differences in the rater's proprietary, oft undisclosed methodologies.
The distortionary impact of methodological differences compounds as
more criteria and data points factor into a rating. In the case of ESG ratings,
the lack of universal definitions for all three constituent elements
environment, social, and governance-infuses the same variance observed
for environmental aspects into the scoring of social and governance matters.
General Motors' social engagement, for example, was rated in the top quartile
by FTSE, but the bottom quartile by MSCI.`
Ratings of corporate climate risk and governance are also likely to vary,
at least in the near term, as rating services develop and refine their metrics
and methods. Compared to the wide swath of data points of potential
relevance to ESG ratings, however, the more narrowly defined scope of
220. See Huber & Comstock, supra note 218.
221. See, e.g., Runsen Zhang & Shinichiro Fujimori, The Role of Transport Electrification
in Global Climate ChangeMitigation Scenarios, 15 ENV' T. RSCH. LETTERS 034019 (2020); David
McCollum et al., Transport Electrification:A Key Element for Energy System Transformation
and Climate Stabilization, 123 CLIMATIC CHANGE 651 (2014).

222. Elon Musk's idiosyncratic leadership style has hurt Tesla's governance score in many

ratings. See, e.g., Kevin Curran, ESG Investors Aren't Riding with Tesla While Elon Is Driving,
THESTREET (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/video/esg-expert-offers-his-take-ontesla-14904491 [https://perma.cc/6GNH-CZDV].
223. James Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-or-exxon-more-sustainableit-depends-whom-you-ask-1537199931 [https://perma.cc/QP29-URH6].
224. Id.
225. Id.
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climate ratings is likely to produce significantly less variance of outcomes.
Moreover, the more focused inquiry into a company's climate risk and
governance should make it easier for investors to better understand and
account for the methodological choices that drive divergent rating results.
Over time, these dynamics should further help foster convergence toward
more consistent or, at least, more transparent rating methodologies.

C. Climate Ratings Are Attainable Here and Now
Federal law bestows valuable privileges upon securities that have received
a favorable rating from Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Fitch, or another of the
five Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations. 226 The
extension of a similar regulatory imprimatur to CDP and other raters of
corporate climate risk and governance, including their admission into the elite
club of Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations, would go a
long way toward placing climate risk on center stage in the investor decisionmaking process. But corporate climate ratings do not require regulatory
endorsement or other forms of government intervention to move the needle
on climate finance in the here and now.
According to the Federal Reserve Bank's latest Survey of Consumer
Finances, more than half of U.S. households own corporate equities. 2 For
families in the upper-middle income group and the top decile, the share of
226. Under the Securities Act of 1933, an offering of non-convertible debt or preferred stock
is eligible for registration via the shortened statement Form S-3 if at least one credit-rating agency
approved as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization has rated the security in
question as investment grade. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current
Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers (MJDS), Exchange Act Release No. 336902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036, 30,055, 30,106 (July 1, 1991). Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Proposed Form 17-H, Risk Assessment Report for Brokers and Dealers requires that a
reporting broker-dealer disclose any commercial paper rating that the firm or its affiliates has
received from a Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization; Rule 10b-6 prohibits any
person engaged in a distribution of securities from buying or bidding for any securities in that
class until their participation in the distribution is completed. In 1983, the SEC adopted an
exception from the rule for nonconvertible debt securities that, among other things, are rated
investment-grade by at least one Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization. See
Prohibition Against Trading by Persons Interested in a Distribution, Exchange Act Release No.
34-19,565, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,628, 10,631, 10,641 (Mar. 14, 1983). Similarly, Rule 2a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, relies on ratings by Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings
Organizations to determine permissible investments for money market funds. Specifically, a rated
security is an eligible investment if the required number of credit rating agencies rate it one of the
two highest ratings for short term debt. See Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6,882, 56 Fed. Reg. 8,113, 8,114 (Feb. 27, 1991). For further
exploration of these and other regulatory privileges attached to credit ratings, see Partnoy, supra
note 207, at 692-93, 693 nn.346-48.
227. See Bhutta et al., supra note 170, at 18.
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stock owners rises to 70% and 90%, respectively.2 2 8 Together, these holdings
account for over 60% of U.S. equities, with an aggregate value of $25
trillion.229 Many of these retail investors hold their stock portfolio as part of
a retirement savings plan, increasingly managed through online brokerage
accounts. 230 Retirement accounts and online brokerage platforms hold
enormous opportunity for private environmental governance to promote
more climate-friendly investment via corporate climate ratings. 23
At the end of 2018, U.S. retirement savings were valued at $35 trillion in
total assets, $15 trillion of which were privately managed through defined
contribution plans and individual retirement accounts. 232 The average value
of individual retirement accounts exceeds $250,000.233 Retail investors
228. Id. at 3, 18.
229. See Kolchin, supra note 168 (noting that valuation data as of 2019 suggest higher
aggregate value following the stock market rally in the second half of 2020).
230. Nearly two-thirds of American households participate in structured retirement plans,
such as a 401(k), defined benefit pension, or an individual retirement account (IRA). See Bhutta
et al., supra note 170, at 20; see also PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31507,
EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANS: INVESTMENT RISK AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 2-5

(2002) (explaining how the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans has been
driven by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Revenue Act of 1978).
231. The concept of private environmental governance recognizes the critical role that private
entities, from corporations to non-governmental organizations, play in addressing environmental
concerns traditionally thought to be the exclusive domain of government regulation. See, e.g.,
Light, supra note 3, at 140 ("In light of the significant impact that firms can have on the
environment ... the law governing the corporation ... should be understood as a fundamental
part of environmental law."); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (2013) ("[N]ew private environmental governance activities play the
standard-setting, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication roles traditionally
played by public regulatory regimes."); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000) ("A careful inquiry into the private role in
governance reveals not only its pervasiveness, but also the extent to which it operates
symbiotically with public authority."). More specifically, the literature has recognized the
importance of third-party ratings and other certification programs for environmental governance.
See David E. Adelman & Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and Private Environmental
Governance, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 709, 710-11 (2017) (explaining how private environmental
governance through product certification "fills information gaps related to public goods and
common pool resources"); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Disclosure of Private
Environmental Governance Risks, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (making a strong
case for more consistent financial reporting of risks posed by private environmental governance
initiatives).
232. See Kolchin, supra note 168, at 6 (reporting $6 trillion and $8.8 trillion in assets for
defined contribution plans and individual retirement accounts, respectively). These numbers are
all but certain to rise as the participant-directed 401(k) plans continue to replace professionally
managed pension plans. See Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make
Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 606 (2014)
("Over the past thirty-five years, participant-directed 401(k) plans have largely replaced
professionally managed pension plans.").
233. See Bhutta et al., supra note 170, at 16.
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saving for retirement not only control a sizeable portion of the U.S. equities
market, but they also manage their assets in a way that readily allows for
consideration of corporate climate ratings. In 401(k) plans and other defined
contribution plans, the employers sponsoring the plan determine the menu of
investment options in conjunction with the service provider they have
selected to manage the plan. 234 Managing these retirement plans is a highly
lucrative business for Fidelity, Vanguard, and other service providers who
not only earn management fees but also increase the likelihood that
employees invest their savings in the service provider's own funds and other
products. 235 As gatekeepers to these lucrative appointments, employers
command considerable clout with service providers eager to secure, and
retain, a plan sponsor's business. 236 It would be easy for a climate-conscious
employer, therefore, to require its service provider to include corporate
climate ratings among the performance metrics of investment options
displayed to their employees. 237 The relatively small number of investment
options available under 401(k) plans, meanwhile, increases the likelihood
that climate ratings will, in fact, be one of the criteria by which employees
make their investment choices.238
Not long ago, retail investors were considered a dying breed, fringe
players in the capital markets arena with little to no prospect of shaping the
outcome. 239 Fast forward just a few years and, suddenly, mom-and-pop
investors are back in the game, accounting for up to one-quarter of stock
market trading volume.24 0 This retail investment renaissance is fueled, in
234. See, e.g., Veronika K. Pool et al., It Pays To Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment
Options in 401(k) Plans, 71 J. FIN. 1779, 1782 (2016) ("401(k) menus are jointly determined by
the plan sponsor (i.e., employer) and the plan's service providers.").
235. Id. at 1780, 1785 (finding "significant favoritism" toward "funds affiliated with the
service provider" in a data set comprising nearly 2,500 retirement plans with an average plan size
of $324 million, surveyed over a ten-year period).
236. Id. at 1779-80.
237. See id. If the growing commitment among companies to renewable energy and other
strategies for reducing their carbon footprint is any indication, this option should prove attractive
to a wide range of retirement plan sponsors. See, e.g., Uma Outka, 100 Percent Renewable:
Company Pledges and State Energy Law, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 661, 671 (2019) (discussing
commitments to become 100% renewably powered by 2020 from Apple, Bank of America, CocaCola, Nike, Walmart, and other icons of corporate America).
238. See Thomas W. Doellman et al., Alphabeticity Bias in 401(k) Investing, 54 FiN. REV.
643, 645 (2019) ("401(k) investors typically choose from a relatively small number of funds
making it more manageable for investors to consider every option.").
239. See, e.g., Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1105
(2009) ("The American retail investor is dying.").
240. See Alexander Osipovich, Individual-Investor Boom Reshapes U.S. Stock Market,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/individual-investor-boom-reshapes-
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large part, by a surge in account openings at online brokerages. 24' Charles
Schwab, E-Trade, and others have all experienced a huge influx of new
clients, with the trading app Robinhood leading the charge on the strength of
an unprecedented three million new accounts opened "in the first four months
of 2020" alone. 242 Gone are the days when individual investors were simply
chasing the market. Today, retail investors demonstrate their strength in
numbers, ready to take on hedge funds and other institutional investors. In
January 2021, Robinhood traders rallied to drive up the stock price of
GameStop by 700%,243 inflicting billions of dollars in losses upon hedge
funds that had shorted the stock. 244 A recent study confirms the ability of
online retail investors to have a significant impact on stock prices, finding

u-s-stock-market-11598866200 [https://perma.cc/UC9R-N9ZN] (reporting a near doubling of
stock market trades by retail investors from 2010 to 2020); Telis Demos, Online Brokers Go from
Zero to Hero, WAIL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-brokers-go-fromzero-to-hero-11579867200 [https://perma.cc/C46S-N5NU] (describing double-digit growth in
trades executed via online trading platforms from 2019 to 2020).
241. Already, the boom in online retail investing has garnered the attention of Wall Street.
See Michael J. de la Merced et al., Morgan Stanley To Buy E-Trade, Linking Wall Street andMain
Street, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/business/morganstanley-etrade.html [https://perma.cc/DPW3-JX72].
242. Weizhen Tan, Retail Investing Boom May Spark Concerns, but Strategist Says Markets

Have
Lived
Through
It
Before,
CNBC
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/10/markets-have-lived-through-retail-investing-booms-beforestrategist-says.html [https://perma.cc/2ZHP-TTQS] ("millennial-favored Robinhood").
243. Maggie Fitzgerald, Robinhood CEO Says Most Customers Are 'Buy and Hold' Amid
GameStop
Trading
Frenzy,
CNBC
(Jan.
27,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/27/robinhood-ceo-says-most-customers-are-buy-and-holdamid-gamestop-trading-frenzy.html [https://perma.cc/PMB5-EJCH]; see also Nathaniel Popper
et al., Robinhood, Under the Gun, Raises $2.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/business/robinhood-gamestop-trading.html
[https://perma.cc/SWQ2-T25A] (describing the Robinhood saga as it unfolded); David Canellis,
At Least 7,500 Robinhood Traders Bought Hertz Stock After Its Latest 100% Pump,
THENEXTWEB (June 25, 2020), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2020/06/25/at-least-7500-

robinhood-traders-bought-hertz-stock-after-its-latest-100-pump/
[https://perma.cc/MBQ6VDNP] (detailing an earlier example of Robinhood traders coalescing around a failing stock in
order to increase its value).
244. See Juliet Chung, Citadel, Point72 To Invest $2.75 Billion into Melvin Capital
Management, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/citadel-point72-toinvest-2-75-billion-into-melvin-capital-management-11611604340
[https://perma.cc/5AACXE9M] (pegging the GameStop-related losses of one hedge fund at $3 billion); see also Popper
et al., supra note 243 (reporting a 135% increase in the stock price of GameStop in a matter of
hours that created losses for those shorting the stock); Canellis, supra note 243 (noting a similar
114% surge in Hertz's stock price in just a few hours).
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that Robinhood traders were responsible for over 7% of the cross-sectional
variation in stock returns during the first half of 2020.245
Robinhood and other online brokerages are especially popular among
millennials, 246 the demographic that most fervently advocates for greater
climate action. 247 It stands to reason, therefore, that inclusion of corporate
climate ratings among the performance metrics displayed by E-Trade,
Charles Schwab, and Robinhood would help millennial retail investors put
their money where their mouth is. If the recent GameStop rally is any
indication, ratings that facilitate more climate-conscious investment by
millennials are all but certain to help move the needle on low-carbon
investment.

D. A Complement to CarbonPricing
Corporate climate ratings complement carbon pricing policies by
amplifying their incentives for abatement as well as mitigating some of the
most pervasive pathologies resulting from today's patchwork of climate
policies. Analysts consider carbon pricing and other policy responses to the
climate crisis as part of the transitional climate risk faced by companies. 24
With their incorporation of both physical and transitional climate risks,249
corporate climate ratings enable financial markets to better assess-and
price-what burden, if any, a carbon tax, cap-and-trade regime, or any other
form of carbon pricing would impose on companies. The resulting market
pressure on companies with a high and, hence, costly carbon footprint would
245. See PHILIPPE VAN DER BECK & CORALIE JAUNIN, SWISS FIN. INST., RESEARCH PAPER
SER. No. 21-12, THE EQUITY MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF THE RETAIL INVESTMENT BOOM 4 (2021).

This impact is all the more impressive considering that Robinhood traders control less than 0.1%
of U.S. equities. Id. at 3. See also JEREMY MICHELS, RETAIL INVESTOR TRADE AND THE PRICING

OF EARNINGS 23 (2021) (examining trading behavior by Robinhood users to conclude that retail
trade "is ... associated with significant changes in the price-earnings relation due to how these
investors respond to earnings-related price movements").
246. See Tan, supra note 242.
247. See, e.g., ALEC TYSON & BRIAN KENNEDY, PEW RSCH. CTR., TWO-THIRDS OF
AMERICANS THINK GOVERNMENT SHOULD Do MORE ON CLIMATE 16 (2020) (reporting that, even
among Republicans who are generally more skeptical of climate action, 88% of millennials
support expanding development of solar farms, with similarly strong numbers for other types of
low-carbon energy options); see also William F. Meehan III, From Gore to Greta: Millennials
Seize the Climate Change Torch from BabyBoomers, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/williammeehan/2019/09/26/from-gore-to-greta-millennials-seize[https://perma.cc/6UWZthe-climate-change-torch-from-babyboomers/?sh=3943f3032e25
WGW3] (arguing that millennials are considerably more focused than earlier generations on "the
greatest existential crisis in human history").
248. See Light, supra note 3, at 166.
249. For a primer on both types of risk, see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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amplify the abatement incentive of a price on carbon. But ratings of corporate
climate risk and governance can do even more. By simultaneously capturing
a company's vulnerability (risk) and contribution (governance) to climate
change, these ratings help penalize corporate attempts to circumvent carbon
pricing, such as through relocation of carbon-intensive activities and other
evasive strategies. 50
Economists have long argued for carbon pricing, by means of a tax on
greenhouse gas emissions or a cap-and-trade regime with tradable emission
allowances, as the first-best policy approach to mitigating climate change.2 5
From an efficiency perspective, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program would
incur far lower opportunity costs than the current potpourri of policies
seeking to combat climate change through financial and regulatory incentives
for solar, wind, and other low-carbon technologies. 5 ' Both public funding for
innovative efforts and the number of available experts are limited. Resources
committed to the promotion of specific low-carbon energy technologies are,
therefore, unavailable to foster technological advances in other fields.2 5 3
Whereas carbon pricing policies force emitters to internalize the social cost
of their emissions and thereby correct a market failure-in other words, an
existing distortion in the economy-policies promoting low-carbon
technologies add a new distortion to the market. 54 Moreover, the transaction
costs associated with a carbon tax are likely to be lower than those generated
by the administration of technology policies that actively support low-carbon
technologies. 5 5
Despite the many arguments that weigh heavily in favor of a carbon tax or
cap-and-trade regime, empirical evidence from around the world suggests
that a meaningful price on greenhouse gas emissions remains elusive in many
250. For an introduction to resource shuffling, emissions leakage, and other challenges
presented by the existing patchwork of carbon pricing policies, see Jim Rossi & Andrew James
Dearing Smith, Electric Power Resource "Shuffling" and Subnational Carbon Regulation:

Looking Upstreamfor a Solution, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 43 (2014) (discussing
the example of California's cap-and-trade regime pursuant to Assembly Bill 32).
251. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and
Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Dominique Finon, Pros and
Cons of Alternative PoliciesAimed at PromotingRenewables, 12 EIB PAPERS, no. 2, 2007, at
110, 112; Kolev & Riess, supra note 44, at 140; STERN, supra note 12, at 35, 348.
252. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 44, at 140. For a representative survey of the primary
policies to promote low-carbon renewable energy technologies, see Felix Mormann, Enhancing
the Investor Appeal ofRenewable Energy, 42 ENv'TL. 681, 690-95 (2012).
253. See Mormann, supra note 252.
254. See id. Like carbon pricing policies, corporate climate ratings seek to correct the market
failure of emission externalities by enabling capital markets to incorporate companies' carbon
emissions and other climate risk factors into their valuation of a company and its assets. See infra
Part III.D.
255. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 44, at 140.
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jurisdictions, at least for the foreseeable future. In 2010, expert commentators
called the assumption "naive" that carbon pricing was "politically
achievable" in the United States. 256 More than a decade later, this assessment
has proven sadly prophetic, at least at the national level.25 Even President
Biden's ambitious climate plan makes no express reference to a carbon tax
or nationwide cap-and-trade program. 258 Carbon pricing initiatives have fared
better at the global level, with a total of 61 policies implemented or scheduled,
slated to cover 22% of global greenhouse gas emissions.2 59 A closer look,
however, reveals that many of these policies woefully underprice carbon.
According to the International Monetary Fund, the average price imposed on
carbon emissions worldwide is only 2 dollars per ton2 60 -a tiny fraction of
the price that experts consider necessary to keep global warming below 2
degrees Celsius.26 1 Only 5% of emissions subject to carbon pricing, a meager
1% of all global greenhouse gas emissions, are priced high enough to meet
the climate targets of the Paris Agreement.2 62
The current patchwork of carbon pricing policies at regional, national, and
sub-national levels of governance is prone to resource shuffling and
emissions leakage, resulting in partial relocation, instead of overall reduction,

256. John A. Alic et al., A New Strategyfor Energy Innovation, 466 NATURE 317 (2010).
257. See, e.g., The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and EnvironmentalJustice,

BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ [https://perma.cc/EJN6-QXV4] [hereinafter
The Biden Plan] (making no reference to a carbon tax or national cap-and-trade program).
Subnational carbon pricing initiatives, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the
Northeast and California's cap-and-trade regime, have made valiant efforts to fill the federal
policy void, albeit with limited coverage. See Welcome, THE REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
https://www.rggi.org/ [https://perma.cc/YQJ9-VAGY]; Cap-and-TradeProgram, CAL. AIR RES.
BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/cap-and-trade-program [https://perma.cc/NS69XQBB].
258. See The Biden Plan, supra note 257. But see Ottmar Edenhofer, CarbonPricing Could
Be
the
Biden
Administration's Climate
Tool,
HILL
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/534985-carbon-pricing-could-be-the-bidenadministrations-climate-tool [https://perma.cc/4NX5-4GAX].
259. MARISSA SANTIKARN ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON

PRICING 2020, at 18 (2020) (reporting a near even split into 31 cap-and-trade and 30 carbon tax
policies).
260. See Ian Parry, Puttinga Price on Pollution, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2019, at 16, 18.
261. See,

e.g.,

CARBON PRICING

LEADERSHIP

COAL.,

REPORT

OF

THE HIGH-LEVEL

COMMISSION ON CARBON PRICES 3, 50 (2017) (pegging the required carbon price at $40-$80 per
ton for 2020 and $50-$100 per ton for 2030).
262. See SANTIKARN ET AL., supra note 259, at 20. But see Patrick Bayer & Michael Aklin,
The European Union Emissions Trading System Reduced CO2 Emissions Despite Low Prices,
117 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 8804 (2020) (arguing that a stable carbon pricing program with

long-term credibility can achieve significant emissions reductions without high prices).
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of greenhouse gas emissions.2 63 Some models suggest that nearly half of the
emissions reductions achieved by carbon pricing in one jurisdiction may
simply shift to neighboring jurisdictions without a price on carbon.2 64 Instead
of actual abatement, large multinationals can just relocate their carbonintensive operations to more emissions-friendly jurisdictions. 26 5 An oil-andgas major headquartered in the United States and listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, for example, may focus its extractive efforts on offshore
fields developed through subsidiaries in order to escape notoriety and carbon
pricing in its home jurisdiction. The resulting reductions in the company's
domestic carbon footprint might unduly endear its stock to investors who lack
the time and resources to study the corporate activities in sufficient detail to
uncover its carbon shuffling. Comprehensive ratings of corporate climate risk
and governance enable investors to see through these and other
circumvention strategies, thereby enhancing the real-world reach and impact
of carbon pricing policies.
E. Common GroundAmidst PartisanClimate Politics
Corporate climate ratings have the potential to improve the political
economy of climate policy and create much-needed common ground amidst
increasingly polarized partisan politics. Climate change has long graduated
from a niche topic that fills the news lull during quiet (and hot) summer
months and entered the political mainstream. Today, 3 in 5 Americans
recognize global warming as a political issue. 266 In early 2020, a nationally
representative survey among U.S. adults found that, for the first time ever,
nearly as many Americans considered "protecting the environment . . . a top
policy priority (64%)" as they did "strengthening the economy (67%).",267 A
majority of Americans specifically named climate change as a top policy
priority (52%), an increase of more than one-third compared to 3 years
263. For a snapshot of the rich literature on emissions leakage under carbon pricing policies,
see James Bushnell & Yihsu Chen, Allocation and Leakage in Regional Cap-and-TradeMarkets
for CO2 , 34 RES. & ENERGY ECON. 647 (2012); Harro van Asselt & Thomas Brewer, Addressing
Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment

Measures in the US and the EU, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 42 (2010).
264. See Justin Caron et al., Leakage from Sub-National Climate Policy: The Case of
California's Cap-and-Trade Program, 36 ENERGY J. 167, 188 (2015) (modeling that 45% of
emissions reductions observed in California register as emissions increases in neighboring states).
265. See id.
&

266. See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC'N

GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC'N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE

AMERICAN MIND 26, 96 (2020).
267. PEW RSCH. CTR., AS ECONOMIC CONCERNS RECEDE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

RISES ON THE PUBLIC'S POLICY AGENDA 4, 6 (2020).
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earlier. 28 But the nation is deeply conflicted over whether and how politics
should contribute to a solution. 269
As scientific consensus around the causes and effects of climate change
continues to solidify, the American public is growing ever more divided. 270
In the words of one commentator, "climate change is currently at its most
politicized."2 7 ' The wide gap in how Democrats and Republicans assess the
reality and importance of climate change has persisted for more than 2
decades. 272 But both camps are now further apart than ever before. 78% of
Democrats view climate change as a top policy priority, compared to only
21% of Republicans. 273 Another survey, administered in the summer of 2019
while record heat waves were sweeping through Europe and the United
States, confirms the American public's deep, and wide, partisan divide over
climate issues. 274 While 68% of Democrats indicated they were "very
concerned" about climate change, a mere 22% of Republicans showed the
same level of concern.2 75 On the other hand, 59% of Republicans thought that
the threat of climate change was exaggerated, compared to just 11% of
Democrats.2 7 6 Similarly, 72% of Democrats, but only 32% of Republicans,
claimed to have personally felt the effects of climate change.2 77 Perhaps most
telling, however, is the fact that a strong majority of Republicans (57%)
denies that climate change is happening as the result of human activity,
compared to a small fraction of Democrats (15%).278 Even the occurrence of

268. Id. The COVID-19 crisis, breaking shortly after the survey was conducted, is likely to
have refocused American priorities on economic, rather than environmental issues.
269. See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Climate Change Rises as a Public Priority. But It's More

Partisan Than Ever, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2020),
https://nyti.ms/37JoN2e
[https://perma.cc/2XSG-PWF5];Oliver Milman, Political Polarisationover Climate Crisis Has
Surged

Under

Trump,

GUARDIAN

(Oct.

11,

2019),

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/l 1/political-polarisation-climate-crisistrump [https://perma.cc/Z8MG-D6FT].
270. See Dunlap et al., supra note 36, at 10; Kamarck, supra note 36.
27 1. Jacqueline Toth, As Wildfires Rage, Divide Widens Between Democratic, GOP Voters

on
Climate
Change,
MORNING
CONSULT
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://morningconsult.com/2018/08/22/as-wildfires-rage-divide-widens-between-democraticgop-voters-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/MV6Y-CNWS].
272. See id.
273. See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 267, at 6, 8.
274. See THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL: JULY 27 -30, 2019-- 1500 US ADULT CITIZENS 77-

83
(July
2019),
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulusuploads/document/hashnbry8/econTabReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UXY4-3H76].
275. Id. at 77.
276. Id. at 79.
277. Id. at 81.
278. See id. at 82.
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hurricanes, wildfires, and other natural disasters in unprecedented frequency
and severity has had little, if any, effect on the partisan gulf on climate. 279
Corporate climate ratings have the potential to bring both parties closer
together on this critical issue. After all, political scientists attribute the
American public's growing partisan polarization over climate change to both
parties' divergent positions on the appropriate role, and size, of
government. 20 The prevailing anti-regulatory view of government among
Republicans is thought to be the driving force behind their refusal to
recognize the reality and importance of climate change. 281 Deeply rooted fear
of the climate crisis' regulatory implications, including carbon pricing, some
argue, is a key motivator behind organized climate change denial.2 " 2
If the divide over climate change, indeed, follows the same fault lines as
the age-old conflict over big government versus market fundamentalism, then
an informational nudge like corporate climate ratings could help create muchneeded common ground. Studies have shown that, as a general matter,
"Republicans do not like nudges more or less than Democrats do." 283
Researchers find no evidence of partisan differences in the American public's
response to nudges when described without mention of specific policy
objectives. 284 Even when connected to specific policy goals and
policymakers, Democrats and Republicans overwhelmingly concurred in
their approval of recent informational nudges, such as calorie labels or
graphic warnings on cigarette packages. 285 Ratings of corporate climate risk
and governance should be even more appealing to Republicans than the
above labels and warnings given the ratings' reliance on the market's
invisible hand to determine whether and how climate change should factor
into investor choices. 286
279. See Kamarck, supra note 36.
280. See, e.g., Dunlap et al., supra note 36, at 15. See generallyORESKES & CONWAY, supra
note 37.
281. See Dunlap et al., supra note 36, at 15; see also Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright,
The Politicization of Climate Change: PoliticalPolarizationin the American Public's Views of
Global Warming, 52 SOcIO. Q. 155, 160 (2011).
282. See Dunlap et al., supra note 36, at 15; Dunlap & McCright, supra note 281, at 160.
283. Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 66 DUKE L.J. 121, 142
(2016).
284. See Janice Y. Jung & Barbara A. Mellers, American Attitudes Toward Nudges, 11
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 62, 63 (2016).

285. See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 187 (reporting, for example, approval ratings of 92% vs.
77% on calorie labels and 77% vs. 68% on cigarette warnings for Democrats and Republicans,
respectively).
286. See Ash Gillis et al., Convincing Conservatives: Private Sector Action Can Bolster

Supportfor Climate ChangeMitigation in the UnitedStates, 73 ENERGY RES. & Soc. SCI. 101947,
101947 (2021) (identifying an "indirect positive spillover effect" when moderates and
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: NUDGING FINANCIAL MARKETS

Legal scholars are quick to offer policy recommendations and
prescriptions informed by our understanding of the pertinent literature,
welfare economics, political intuition, and other sources of inspiration. But
we rarely bother to test, let alone validate, the real-world applicability of our
wisdom, leaving the implementation of our oh-so-brilliant ideas to the
policymakers whose attention our writing hopes to attract. The law professor
among us has also been guilty of this lofty approach.2"' This section reports
the attempt to put our money-or, to be exact, that of retail investors-where
our mouth is. We collected and analyzed experimental data from over fifteen
hundred participants to test whether corporate climate ratings can, in fact,
nudge investors toward more climate-friendly investment decisions.
Calls for more and better disclosure of climate-related financial
information by publicly listed companies implicitly assume that such
disclosures will affect investor behavior.2 "' Presumably, understanding the
threats and opportunities that climate change presents for a given company
enables rational investors to reconsider the profitability of buying stocks,
bonds, or other securities issued by that company. 289 Other, less profitoriented investors may want to base their choice of stocks on the issuing
corporation's position on climate change, scorning bad actors while
rewarding leaders in mitigation and adaptation with their capital
investment. 290 The following survey experiments test whether the inclusion
of a climate rating among stock performance metrics can nudge investors
toward more climate-friendly choices.
conservatives "perceive[ ] private approaches to be feasible and effective," fostering greater
support for climate change mitigation).
287. See, e.g., Gary Lucas, Jr. & Felix Mormann, Betting on Climate Policy: Using
PredictionMarkets To Address Global Warming, 52 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1429 (2019) (calling for
use of prediction markets to inform the design and implementation of carbon pricing and other
climate policies); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 335 (2019)
(recommending greater application of Elinor Ostrom's polycentric approach to government to
address the distributional inequities caused by the transition to a low-carbon economy); Felix
Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015) (advocating for closer
integration of quantity- and price-based clean energy policies).
288. See supra notes 226-245 and accompanying text.
289. See id.
290. See Herwig Pilaj, The Choice Architecture ofSustainable and Responsible Investment:
Nudging Investors Toward Ethical Decision-Making, 140 J. Bus. ETHIcS 743, 745 (2017)
("Investors want more than just to maximize their expected payoff.... Money is not everything.
While we want to make money, we simultaneously want to express personal values and seek peer
approval."); Ryan W. Buell & Basak Kalkanci, How Transparency into Internal and External
Responsibility Initiatives Influences Consumer Choice, 67 MGMT. Sci. 932 (2021) (presenting
evidence that consumers take corporate responsibility efforts, including sustainability initiatives,
into account in their decision making).
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A. Methods and Data
Data was collected in three batches through two digitally administered
survey experiments designed for the stated purpose of better understanding
financial decision-making- a study title sufficiently general to avoid unduly
biasing participants.29' Experimental methods are widely used for research in
economics 292 and have steadily gained importance in investment and other
financial contexts. 293 At the same time, online experiments have emerged as
a generally accepted alternative to lab experiments. 294
For the first batch, 590 participants were recruited through Texas A&M
University's (TAMU) Bulkmail service, a listserv that reaches university
students, staff, and faculty who have opted into receiving research emails. 2 95
University affiliates participated voluntarily and without compensation,
motivated by a shared sense of identity and the common goal of advancing
knowledge.
Mindful of the lack of representativeness and other well-documented
limitations of university-recruited participant pools, 296 two more batches of
500 participants each were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) platform that provides researchers with relatively low-cost access to
online experiment participants. Participants recruited through MTurk
completed online experiments in exchange for compensation. The relatively
modest amounts of compensation offered notwithstanding, experimental data
collected on MTurk have been found valid across a wide range of contexts. 297
291. All experiments were approved by Texas A&M University's Institutional Review Board
under IRB 2020-0723.
292. See, e.g., John A. List, Why Economists Should Conduct Field Experiments and 14 Tips

for Pulling One Off, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3 (2011); Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory,
8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 113 (1994).
293. See, e.g., Brian Knutson & Peter Bossaerts, Neural Antecedents of FinancialDecisions,
27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8174 (2007).
294. See, e.g., John J. Horton et al., The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a
Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399 (2011).

295. Bulkmail, TEX. A&M UNIV., https://it.tamu.edu/services/email-messaging-andcollaboration/email-tools/bulkmail/ [https://perma.cc/RJL9-MUDG].
296. See, e.g., JosephHenrich et al., The Weirdest People in the World?, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Scis. 61 (2010) (offering a powerful critique of the disproportionate representation of "Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies" in behavioral research
recruiting from university subject pools); see also Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010) ("Internet subject
populations tend to be closer to the U.S. population as a whole than subjects recruited from
traditional university subject pools.").
297. See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of
Inexpensive Data?, 6 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. Sci. 3 (2011); Leib Litman et al., The Relationship
Between Motivation, Monetary Compensation, and Data Quality Among US- and India-Based
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To ensure the highest-possible quality of data, the survey was run using
Amazon's CloudResearch platform, formerly known as TurkPrime, that
offers a variety of advanced filtering functions.298 The survey experiment was
open only to participants who had successfully completed at least five
hundred other MTurk tasks with an approval rate of 93% or better.
In addition, all three batches were subject to the following, widely used
measures to ensure that only data from participants who made a bona fide
effort would be analyzed. Data from participants who failed to answer all
questions in the relatively short survey (median response time of five
minutes) were excluded from analysis. Participants who failed to follow
survey instructions, most notably to allocate the exact sum of $5,000 or
percentages totaling 100% among the three target stocks, were also
excluded. 299 Application of these control measures resulted in a final sample
of 559 responses from the TAMU population as well as 496 and 478
responses, respectively, obtained via MTurk. TAMU respondents skewed
60% female and were between 18 and 81 years old (with a mean of 31 years).
In the first MTurk batch, respondents skewed 56% male and were between
18 and 77 years of age (with a mean of 39 years). Respondents in the second
MTurk batch also skewed 54% male with an age range from 20 to 79 years
(with a mean of 40 years). Table 1 offers a summary of participant
demographics.

Workers on Mechanical Turk, 47 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 519 (2015); for examples of data
collection via MTurk for legal scholarship, see Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests
of IntellectualPropertyLaws' Creativity Thresholds, 93 TEx. L. REv. 1921 (2014); Simon Hedlin
& Cass R. Sunstein, Does Active ChoosingPromote Green Energy Use? ExperimentalEvidence,
43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107 (2016).
298. For a primer on TurkPrime, see Leib Litman et al., TurkPrime.com: A Versatile
Crowdsourcing Data Collection Platform for the Behavioral Sciences, 49 BEHAV. RSCH.
METHODS 433 (2017).

299. For an introduction to the widespread use of these and other attention checks in survey
experiments on MTurk and beyond, see David J. Hauser & Norbert Schwarz, Attentive Turkers:

MTurk

Participants Perform Better on Online Attention Checks than do Subject Pool

Participants,48 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 400 (2016).
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Experiment 2

Participant Pool

TAMU

MTurk 1

MTurk 2

Number of Participants

559

496

478

Average Age

31 years

39 years

40 years

Gender

60% female

56% male

54% male

Table : Participant demographics by participant pool

B. Experiment 1: Climate Ratings Impact Investor Choices
To test whether corporate climate ratings have an effect on investor
decision making, the following first experiment was devised to compare the
investment behavior of participants across two conditions. The control
condition presented participants with stock investment options accompanied
by performance data representative of online trading platforms, while the
treatment condition included climate ratings as an additional metric for each
stock. Results provide strong evidence of a climate ratings effect on retail
investor behavior.

1.

Experimental Design

At the beginning of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two groups. Both groups were presented with a hypothetical scenario
in which participants had decided to invest a recent inheritance of $5,000 in
stocks. Having narrowed their investment options down to three options, they
were presented with a table that listed the stocks of corporations "A," "B,"
and "C," as well as the kind of data on historical performance typically
displayed by online trading platforms. After looking over their respective
stock table, each respondent was asked to allocate their $5,000 across the
three stocks on display. After participants completed the investment task,
additional information was collected for control variables, such as financial
literacy, investment experience, political beliefs, attitude towards the
environment, and demographics.
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Name

Asset Class

Listed

1-yr performance

3-yr performance

A Corp.

Stocks

NYSE

673%

13.48%

B Corp.

Stocks

NYSE

S.10%

15.18%

C Corp.

Stocks

NYSE

7.42%

14.71%

Figure 1: Stock table displayed in control condition

Figure 1 depicts a version of the stock table shown to participants assigned
to the control condition. Within each condition, participants were randomly
assigned to sub-conditions that varied the order in which stocks were listed
in the table to ensure that results were not affected by the ordering or other
visual representation of stocks.300 Based on past performance, a commonly
used indicator of future performance, 30' the stocks of "B Corp." would
promise the highest returns and presumably attract greater investment than
solid-performing "C Corp." or worst-performing "A Corp." Figure 2 depicts
a version of the stock table displayed to participants assigned to the treatment
condition. Here, the dummy variable of listed stock exchange has been
replaced with a graphic illustration of the corporations' climate rating. The
previously dominant investment choice ("B Corp.") features the worst
climate rating of the three stocks, worst-performing "A Corp." has a middling
rating, and solid-performing "C Corp." boasts the highest climate rating. As
in the control condition, participants in the treatment condition were
randomly assigned to sub-conditions that varied the order in which stocks
were listed in the table to ensure that results were not affected by the ordering
or other visual representation of stocks.3 0 2

300. See Doellman et al., supra note 238, at 643, 657 (demonstrating that the order in which
investment options are displayed has a significant impact on fund allocation by investors).
301. See, e.g., Shlomo Bernartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k)
Accounts to Company Stock, 56 J. FIN. 1747 (2001) (observing excessive extrapolation of past
performance by investors attempting to predict a stock's future performance); Beth A. Pontari et
al., Regulating Information Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the United States: Will
Consumers Utilize Cost Information?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 333, 333, 342 (2009) (finding that
investors "overwhelmingly continue to use past performance" when choosing among investment
options, even when confronted with highly salient advertisements of other relevant metrics); see
also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1126 (1974) (noting how a representativeness bias leads to predictions of
future developments, in stock value and beyond, to be made based on past performance and
events).
302. See Doellman et al., supra note 238, at 643, 657.
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Name

Asset Class

A Corp.

Stocks

S Corp.

Stocks

C Corp.

Stocks

Climate Rating

[Ariz. St. L.J.

1-yr performance

3-yr performance

6.73%

13.48%

98.10%/

15.18%

7.42%

14.71%

Figure 2: Stock table displayed in treatment condition

2.

Results

In both the TAMU and MTurk batches of Experiment 1, the inclusion of
a climate rating among the stock performance data presented to participants
significantly increased the amount of money they invested in "C Corp.," the
company whose stock offered a solid, albeit not the best, performance track
record but featured the highest climate rating.

2500
2000

1500
1oQ~J
500

a
Con trol

"Chmate Ratirg"

Figure 3: Mean investment in most climate-friendly stock by MTurk participants
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MTurk participants in the treatment condition invested, on average,
$2,223.87 (SD=1,280.16) in the solid-performing but highest climate-rated
stock of "C Corp." compared to the mean investment of $1,338.08
(SD=638.76) by participants in the control condition who were not provided
with climate ratings. Put differently, inclusion of a climate rating in the stock
performance data presented to participants increased investment in the
company with the highest climate rating but middling stock performance by,
on average, $835.79 or 60% compared to the control condition. These results,
depicted in Figure 3 above, are highly statistically significant (p<.001)303 and
hold when controlling for age, gender, political beliefs, investment
experience, household income, and other demographic factors.
$ 2550.48

30JQ
2500
200$

1403.97

Figure 4: Mean investment in most climate-friendly stock by TAMU participants

The observed effect was even larger for responses collected from members
of the TAMU community. Here, participants in the treatment condition
invested, on average, $2,550.48 (SD=1,223.91) in the solid-performing stock
of the highest climate-rated company compared to the mean investment of
$1,403.97 (SD=823.89) by participants in the control condition who were not
exposed to the climate rating. In other words, the climate rating increased
investment in the highest-rated company by, on average, $1,146.51 or 82%
compared to the control condition. These results, depicted in Figure 4 above,
are highly statistically significant (p<.001).

303. With the exception of our regression analysis below, statistical significance throughout
this Article is determined via paired t-tests. For a discussion of the use of t-tests in statistical
analysis, see Michael P. Fay & Michael A. Proschan, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney or T-Test? On
Assumptions for Hypothesis Tests and Multiple Interpretations of Decision Rules, 4 STAT. SURVS.

1(2010).
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C. Experiment 2: The Impact of Framingand Format
Experiment 2, described in greater detail below, was inspired by the desire
to better understand the climate ratings effect on investor behavior. Drawing
from the literature on behavioral economics and choice architecture,
manipulations to framing and display format tested the efficacy of various
potential representations of corporate climate ratings. Subtle changes to the
experimental design further increased overall ecological validity30 4 while
ruling out competing explanations for the observed effect of climate ratings
on investment choices. The results of Experiment 2 confirm the capacity of
corporate climate ratings to nudge investors toward more climate-friendly
investment choices, while adding valuable nuance to better understand how
differences in framing and display format impact overall effect magnitude.

1.

Experimental Design

The large effects observed in Experiment 1 raise the question whether
participants' responses might have been driven, at least in part, by
considerations beyond the information embedded in the rating of the three
companies' climate risk and governance. Specifically, responses could have
been affected by the saliency of the climate ratings' colorful graphical
representation...' Accordingly, color graphics were replaced with grayscale
versions for the second experiment, as illustrated in Figure 5. To illustrate the
randomization of stock presentation and sequencing within conditions, this
figure depicts "A Corp." as the most climate-friendly company.

304. The term "ecological validity" is used to connote the extent to which it is possible to
generalize from observed behavior in a laboratory or other controlled experimental settings to
natural behavior in the real world. See, e.g., Mark A. Schmuckler, What Is Ecological Validity?
A Dimensional Analysis, 2 INFANCY 419, 420 (2010) ("[E]cological validity often refers to the
relation between real-world phenomena and the investigation of these phenomena in experimental
contexts").
305. A growing body of literature has documented the pervasive effects of saliency on
perception and choice. See, e.g., Blythe R. Towal et al., Simultaneous Modeling of Visual Saliency
and Value Computation Improves Predictions of Economic Choice, 110 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD.
Scis. U.S. 3858 (2013) (explaining how more salient items in a display attract more attention and,
presumably, greater consideration from consumers); William J. Bazley et al., Visual Finance: The
Pervasive Effects ofRed on Investor Behavior, 67 MGMT. Sci. 5301 (2021) (offering empirical
evidence of the way that the use of certain colors in the display of financial information affects
investor behavior).
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3-yr performance

A Corp.

Stocks

6 Corp.

Stocks

$7.42%

14.71%

C Corp.

Stocks

6.73%

13.48%

f8.10%

1518%

Figure 5: Grayscale graphics in treatment condition "Contribution to Climate Change"

A second potential problem with the original experimental design relates
to the fact that participants' remuneration was originally set without
consideration of their investment choices. This disconnect between task
compensation and stock performance calls into question whether respondents
would have made the same investment decisions if returns from the chosen
investment portfolio had the potential to affect their personal bottom line.
Empirical evidence suggests that, on socially sensitive topics such as climate
change or clean energy, survey respondents often opt for what they consider
the socially appropriate answer.3 0 6 But when it comes time to put their money
where their mouth is, few follow through. 307 To preempt this "lip service" or
"bank money" effect, Experiment 2 includes a performance incentive,
allowing participants to earn a bonus of up to 50% on top of their guaranteed
task compensation, based on the simulated performance of their chosen stock
portfolio. 308
Behavioral research has long recognized the fundamental importance of
available information and its processing for decision outcomes. 309 Wellestablished limits in the human capacity for processing information call for
presenting decision-relevant information in a format that is easy to digest and
306. See Pilaj, supra note 290, at 745 (noting investors' desire for peer approval of their asset
allocation choices).
307. See, e.g., Kolev & Riess, supra note 44, at 144 (reporting that one in three electricity
customers expressed their willingness to opt into higher-priced, clean power plans, but only a
fraction actually subscribed to the green plan their utility offered).
308. For examples of experimental asset markets with similar performance incentives, see
Martin Weber & Colin F. Camerer, The DispositionEffect in Securities Trading:An Experimental
Analysis, 33 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 167 (1998); Bazley et al., supra note 305, at 5621.
309. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A BehavioralModel ofRational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON.
99 (1955) (introducing the concept of bounded rationality for decision-making that deviates from
perfectly rational choices due to cognitive limitations and cues in the choice environment).
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understand.3 10 Successful framing and formatting strategies include
translating available information into more meaningful formats, rendering
relevant but not necessarily available information more visible, and the
provision of social reference points. 31' To better understand the impact of
framing and presentation on the efficacy of corporate climate ratings,
Experiment 2 complemented the treatment condition of a generic "Climate
Rating" from Experiment 1 with three novel treatment conditions. While
three of the four treatment conditions featured the same type of grayscale
graphics, their labeling varied. Two of the new treatment conditions were
labeled "Contribution to Climate Change" and "Vulnerability to Climate
Change." Notwithstanding variations in labeling, graphics were identical
across all three graphically represented treatment conditions to ensure
consistency and comparability. The third new treatment condition, labeled
"Global Warming Pathway," is based on CDP's latest initiative to translate
corporate climate risk and governance into a global warming trajectory. This
translational assessment considers a company's current carbon footprint as
well as stated targets for future emission reductions, then determines the longterm global warming potential if worldwide greenhouse gas emissions were
reduced at the same pace as the company's. 3 12 This treatment condition is the
only one using numbers instead of graphics, adopting CDP's representation
of the resulting pathway for global warming in degrees Celsius, as illustrated
in Figure 6. To illustrate the randomization of stock presentation and
sequencing within conditions, Figure 6 depicts "A Corp." as the most
climate-friendly company.

310. See George A. Miller, The MagicalNumber Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on
Our Capacityfor ProcessingInformation, 63 PSYCH. REV. 81 (1956).

311. See, e.g., Richard P. Larrick & Jack B. Soll, The MPG Illusion, 320 SCIENCE 1593
(2008) (revealing cognitive limitations that lead consumers to misinterpret gas-mileage
information depicted in the miles-per-gallon format findings that led to revision of the so-called
Monrooney label for new vehicles); Simon et al., supra note 194 (reporting a 13% decrease in
hospitalizations for foodborne illness following the requirement for restaurants to display their
hygiene ratings). A comprehensive discussion of the multitude of potential interventions related
to decision information is beyond the scope of this work. Readers interested in exploring more
than the illustrative examples provided above are encouraged to consult Robert Mtnscher et al.,
A Review and Taxonomy of Choice Architecture Techniques, 29 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
511, 514-16 (2016).
312.

CDP

Temperature

Ratings,

CLIMATE

DISCLOSURE

https://www.cdp.net/en/investor/temperature-ratings [https://perma.cc/F9QM-STY9].
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__________

Asset Class
__________

Global Warming
Pathway

1-yr performance

1269
3-yr performance
_______

_______

A Corp.

Stacks

1.8 degrees

7.42%

14.71%

B Carp.

Stocks

2.4 degrees

6.73%

13.48%

C Corp.

Stacks

3.1 degrees

8.10%

15.18%

Figure 6: Numerical information in treatment condition "Global Warming Pathway"

2.

Results

Experiment 2 provides further evidence of the climate ratings effect on
retail investor behavior. Compared to the control condition, participants
across all treatment conditions invested more of their money in "C Corp.,"
the company featuring the best climate rating and a solid, but not the strongest
stock performance track record among the three stocks. Variations in the
observed effect size provide important insights into which framing and
formatting approaches have the greatest appeal to investors, including some
counter-intuitive findings.
In the "Climate Rating" treatment condition carried over from Experiment
1, the observed effect was reduced, confirming our intuition that initial results
may have been driven, in part, by the visual saliency of ratings and the "bank
money" effect. Even after mitigating these distractors with the use of
grayscale graphics and by offering a strong performance incentive, however,
the overall effect remained statistically significant (p=.03): participants in the
"Climate Rating" condition invested, on average, $1,735.88 (SD=1,157.61)
in climate-friendly "C Corp." compared to only $1,444.07 (SD=629.92) in
the control condition. The observed climate ratings effect in this condition,
thus, produced an increase of $291.81 or 20% in climate-friendly investment.
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1 1444.UI

Figure 7: Mean investment in "Climate Rating" condition

The role of past greenhouse gas emissions by developed nations and their
historic contributions to climate change has proven highly controversial in
international climate negotiations. Developing nations and many
commentators demand that developed nations, who have achieved their
advanced status thanks to the plentiful burning of fossil fuels, bear greater
financial responsibility for climate change.31' It would seem reasonable,
therefore, to assume that a climate rating framed in terms of a company's
contribution to climate change would have a significant impact on
investment. Retail investors, however, seem to care relatively little about
corporate contributions to global warming. Of all treatment conditions in
Experiment 2, the "Contribution to Climate Change" rating prompted the
smallest increase of investment in the most climate-friendly stock. This
finding suggests that, for most investors, profit motives still prevail over
moral considerations such as equity or justice. Average investment of
$1,594.65 (SD=1,264.74) in the stock with the most favorable "Contribution
to Climate Change" rating represents a gain of $150.58 or 10% compared to
the $1,444.07 of average investment in the control condition; this difference,
however, did not reach statistical significance (p=.30).

313. See, e.g., Shyam Saran, Paris Climate Talks: Developed Countries Must Do More Than
Reduce
Emissions,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
23,
2015),

https://www.theguardian. com/environent/2015/nov/23 /paris-climate-talks-developedcountries-must-do-more-than-reduce-emissions [https://perma.cc/NG2T-G68U] (highlighting
the responsibility borne by developed countries whose historic emissions have contributed
disproportionately to global warming and climate change).
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Figure 8: Mean investment in "Contribution to Climate Change" condition

The "Global Warming Pathway" format championed by CDP fared only
slightly better, raising average investment in the stock with the lowest global
warming pathway to $1634.40 (SD=944.19) for a gain of $190.33 or 13%
over the control condition; the observed effect was marginally significant
(p=.11). This less-than-impressive investor mobilization may be explained
by the well-documented lack of familiarity with the Celsius temperature scale
among large portions of the U.S. population. 14

314. See, e.g., Eugene Y. Chan, Climate Change Is the World's GreatestThreat

in Celsius

or Fahrenheit?, 60 J. ENV'T PSYCH. 21 (2018) (presenting empirical evidence that the choice of
temperature scale in presenting global warming data influences peoples' belief in and concern
over climate change). For a more general account of the cultural and other challenges associated
with effective communication of climate-related information, see Sander L. van der Linden et al.,
How To Communicate the Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: Plain Facts, Pie Charts or
Metaphors?, 126 CLIMATIC CHANGE 255 (2014).
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Figure 9: Mean investment in "Global Warming Pathway" condition

The rating labeled "Vulnerability to Climate Change" delivered by far the
greatest spike in climate-conscious investment, leading participants to invest,
on average, $2,243.46 (SD=1,348.24) in the company with the most
favorable climate
1000 rating. Compared to a mean investment of $1444.07 in the
control condition, the vulnerability rating prompted a stunning increase of
$799.39 or 55% of average investment; this effect is highly statistically
significant (p<.001). This finding confirms that investors care deeply about
the climate risk 0 exposure of their potential investment targets, adding further
support to initiatives to promote more, and better, disclosure of climaterelated risk on capital markets.'1
Figure 9: Mean investment in "Glbal

00$

ring PoCiaty Coangd"tiondtn
$ 2243.46

1444.07

1400

Control

315. See supra Part I.A.

"unGlabtyWarIn
Clmate Change
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Controlling for Individual Characteristics

The observed climate ratings effect holds for both the generically labeled
"Climate Rating" condition and the "Vulnerability to Climate Change"
condition after controlling for a set of standard individual characteristics
Gender, Age, Education, Income, Understanding of Financial Products,
Stock Market Participation,EnvironmentalConcern, and PoliticalViews. 316
Tables 2 and 3 report regression estimates of these variables on climatefriendly investment, i.e., the average additional investment in the most
climate-friendly stock, compared to the control condition. Vulnerability and
Climate Rating are indicator variables set to one if the individual was
randomly assigned to the "Vulnerability to Climate Change" or "Climate
Rating" condition, and zero for the control condition. Column (1) reports that
the average additional investment in the most climate-friendly stock is
$799.38 for the Vulnerability condition and $291.80 for the Climate Rating
condition, out of $5,000 invested. In columns (2) to (9), we include the
aforementioned demographic variables one by one to control for
heterogeneous individual characteristics. The additional investment in the
most climate-friendly stock is stable and varies only slightly across these
specifications, from $772.81 to $827.48 for the Vulnerability condition and
from $261.15 to $296.23 for the Climate Rating condition. Column (10)
includes all control variables simultaneously.

316. For details regarding the definition of these individual characteristics and their coding,
see infra Appendix: Definition of Variables.
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Table 2: Regression analysis for "Vulnerability to Climate Change" condition
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Table 3: Regression analysis for "Climate Rating" condition

D. Insights, Caveats, and Suggestionsfor FutureResearch
Our findings offer strong evidence that corporate climate ratings can
nudge retail investors to make more climate-friendly investment choices.
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This climate ratings effect, first observed in Experiment 1, persisted in
Experiment 2 even after our modifications mitigated the potential impact of
visual saliency and the "bank money" effect. 317 Our data also offers a
cautionary tale insofar as the effect varies depending on the framing and
display format of ratings. While we observed higher average investment in
the most climate-friendly stock across all four treatment conditions of
Experiment 2 (Fig. 11), this effect was statistically significant only for the
two conditions where climate-relevant information was presented using the
labels "Climate Rating" and "Vulnerability to Climate Change.'
2,500-

2,001,500-

500-

0-

coGnrol

Cimate.

Cqn"TrfibluIt io to
tig Cf imatte thange

Glnb]a l

Waring

t W~etr;I~lty to
Cltimate ChtangeC

Figure 11: Comparison across conditions in Experiment 2318

Our evidence regarding the import of presentation and framing of climaterelevant financial information is consistent with the literatures on behavioral
economics, behavioral finance, and climate communication. Behavioral
economics has long recognized that the multitude of ways in which
information and options can be presented to decision-makers affect their
eventual choices. 319 More recently, research in the emerging field of
behavioral finance has demonstrated how the presentation of financially

317. See supra Figure 7 and accompanying text.
318. The dashed horizontal gray line uses the control condition's investment of $1,444.07 as
a point of reference to illustrate the additional investment in treatment conditions.
319. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23
MKTG. LETTERS 487 (2012) (surveying the research on the impact of information presentation on
consumer choices); Paul H. Dolan et al., Influencing Behaviour: The Mindspace Way, 33 J. ECON.
PSYCH. 264 (2012) (cataloging ways in which informational factors affect behavioral outcomes).

1276

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

'

relevant information affects investor decision making. 320 The literature on
climate communication, finally, has repeatedly highlighted the challenges
associated with presenting complex climate-related information in an
intuitive format accessible to a non-expert audience. 32
The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures frequently
emphasizes the growing investor demand for "decision-useful" information
but offers little, if any, guidance what that information is and how it should
be presented. 322 Drawing on insights from the three aforementioned
literatures, future research should continue to test the efficacy of corporate
climate ratings depicted in various formats to ensure that these ratings deliver
critical, climate-related financial information to investors in an easy-tounderstand format. Otherwise, well-meaning but less-than-intuitive efforts,
such as CDP's global warming pathway format depicted in degrees Celsius,
run the risk of confusing investors, rather than helping them make more
climate-friendly choices.
So far, we have demonstrated the potential of corporate climate ratings as
well as the importance of, and challenges associated with, their proper design.
Turning from design to implementation, two further caveats are in order.
First, if raters of corporate climate risk and governance indeed follow in the
largely unregulated footsteps of credit rating agencies, 323 they will need to
build reputational capital. 324 Just as rating agencies owe their existence to
320. See, e.g., Bazley et al., supra note 305 (offering empirical evidence of how the use of
red color in stock charts changes investor behavior); Doellman et al., supra note 238
(demonstrating how investors' allocation of retirement savings among mutual funds is affected
by the order in which funds are listed).
321. See, e.g., Richard Black, No More Summariesfor

Wonks,

5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE

282 (2015) (criticizing the IPCC's failure to communicate climate-related information directly
and effectively to policymakers and the public); David V. Budescu et al., Improving
Communication of Uncertaintyin the Reports ofthe IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change,

20 PSYCH. SCI. 299 (2009) (offering recommendations for more accessible communication of
climate information); van der Linden et al., supra note 314 (suggesting that climate-related
information is best communicated via "a short, simple message that is easy to comprehend and
remember").
322. See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, supra note 76, at 4-5

(commenting that not enough companies are disclosing decision-useful climate-related financial
information).
323. For a primer on the lack of regulatory guidance for the operation of credit rating agencies
and related reform proposals, see Hill, supra note 210; see also Stephen Choi, Market Lessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 934 (1998) (noting the critical role Standard & Poor's
and Moody's play in financial markets despite operating "without any regulatory intervention");
Partnoy, supra note 207, at 628-36 (offering a review of the literature on the "reputational capital"
view of credit rating agencies).
324. For a general discussion of the importance of reputational capital for third-party
certification providers, see Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
andAsset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 288-93 (1984).
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information asymmetries between issuers of debt and investors, so too will
climate rating agencies fill information gaps in capital markets by providing
accurate, not readily available information to investors. 325
In the context of financially relevant corporate climate data, this will
require gathering, decoding, and recoding information from a variety of
sources into a single, consumer-friendly format.326 In the constantly evolving
scientific and policy landscape of climate change, the task of informational
gap-filling will be neither easy nor cheap. 327 Credit rating agencies fund their
analytics by charging issuers of debt fees that the latter pay willingly in order
to receive better terms (and favorable regulatory treatment328) as they raise
capital on financial markets. Raters of climate risk and governance will likely
face some difficulties, at least in the near term, of persuading publicly traded
companies to pay for a climate rating that may, or may not, increase the
investor appeal of their securities. Our data indicates that investors deem the
information contained in a climate rating valuable, suggesting the same
should, eventually, be true of companies. Other third-party certifications,
such as the costly yet popular LEED certification for buildings or the growing
market for certified-organic food, give cause for cautious optimism that
enough companies will recognize the benefits of a climate rating to pay the
fees necessary to fund the research and analysis of rating agencies.329 As more
and more companies begin to offer climate ratings, market pressure on others
to do the same is expected to increase. At the same time, fear of the fallout
from a negative climate rating will likely provide additional motivation for
carbon-intensive companies and other laggards to take more decisive climate
action. Before such a race to the top can truly take off, however, patience and
significant up-front investment will be needed to develop a sustainable
business model for raters of corporate climate risk and governance.

325. See, e.g., Susan M. Phillips & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, InternationalBanking Activities:
The Role ofthe FederalReserve Bank in Domestic CapitalMarkets, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1754,
1762-63 (1998) ("[C]redit rating agencies enhance the capital markets infrastructure by distilling
a great deal of information into a single credit rating for a security.").
326. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role ofDebt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1110 (1995) (describing the task of credit rating agencies
and other securities analysts as "decoding ambiguous signals").
327. See Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 325, at 1762-63.
328. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory privileges that
federal law attaches to investment-grade ratings for publicly traded debt instruments).
329. See generally Ozge Suzer, A Comparative Review of Environmental Concern
Prioritization:LEED vs Other Major Certification Systems, 154 J. ENV'T MGMT. 266 (2015)
(providing an introduction to the benefits and costs of LEED certification viewed in comparative
context); Luanne Lohr, Implicationsof Organic Certificationfor Market Structure and Trade, 80
AM. J. AGRic. ECON. 1125 (1998) (providing a primer on the market dynamics underlying the
certification of organic food).
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The second caveat relates to the well-documented criticisms leveled
against the ethics of nudges such as the proposed ratings of corporate climate
risk and governance. Opponents condemn nudges as paternalistic
interventions with potentially adverse effects on the autonomy and welfare
of stakeholders. 330 Proponents emphasize the overall choice-preserving
nature of nudges, classifying them as a libertarian form of paternalism,33
albeit with limited success at persuasion.332 The autonomy-reducing
paternalism critique cannot, however, be extended to educative nudges, such
as climate ratings that provide stakeholders with decision-relevant
information packaged in an intuitive format. Such open-ended nudge
interventions arguably increase both the autonomy and welfare of
stakeholders who are empowered to make more informed choices. The
ethical case for these educative nudges is even stronger to the extent that they
seek to remedy externalities and other market failures.3 33 With their
profoundly negative impact on social welfare, environmental externalities
like the greenhouse gas emissions that drive global warming-represent one
of the most challenging market failures of our time. Accordingly, even the
most fervent nudge critics would likely struggle to discredit the externalityoriented, educative ratings of corporate climate risk and governance proposed
in this Article. 3 4

330. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, BehavioralLaw & Economics: Its
Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implicationsfor Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The UncertainPsychological Casefor Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003);
Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444 (2007); Edward L.
Glaeser, Paternalismand Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006).
331. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Colin Camerer et al., Regulationfor Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211
(2003).

332. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, LibertarianPaternalismIs an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1245 (2005); Heidi M. Hurd, Fudging Nudging: Why Libertarian Paternalism Is the
ContradictionIt ClaimsIt's Not, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703 (2016); MARK D. WHITE, THE
MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (Palgrave Macmillan 1st ed.
2013).
333. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (Harv. Univ. Press 1984)

(discussing the widespread consensus regarding the legitimacy of government intervention in
response to market failures).
334. See generally Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New

Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 878-92 (2014) (making a persuasive case for greater reliance
on "climate nudges").
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CONCLUSION

In his seminal work on the efficient market hypothesis, Nobel Laureate
Eugene Fama described the core mission of financial markets as allocation of
the economy's capital stock, with accurate price signals guiding the
allocation of resources by investors and companies. 335 Without a meaningful
price on carbon, financial markets produce price signals that fail to properly
account for climate change and its dramatic social welfare costs. As a result,
capital continues to flow freely toward fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive
assets, exacerbating rather than combating global climate change.
In the absence of government guidance, a trifecta of private ordering
efforts is trying to mobilize capital markets as a force for good in the war on
carbon. But shareholder climate activism, calls for better climate-related
financial disclosures, and the divestment movement have all failed to usher
in a new era of low-carbon capitalism that prioritizes climate-friendly options
over carbon-intensive assets.
This Article makes the conceptual and empirical case for using corporate
climate ratings to catalyze more carbon-conscious investment. Independent
ratings of companies' exposure to climate risk, their mitigation strategies, and
related opportunities offer valuable information to guide investors toward
more climate-friendly assets, for the dual benefit of the investor's bottom line
and the environment. Modeled after the ratings of creditworthiness that have
long informed capital allocation on financial markets, our proposed climate
ratings build on methodology familiar to companies and investors alike.
Unlike most reform proposals, corporate climate ratings are available here
and now without the need for government intervention or authorization.
Climate ratings further amplify the abatement incentives provided by carbon
pricing and other climate policies, all while creating much needed common
ground amidst the growing partisan polarization of climate action.
Most law review articles would have ended here. But we did not want
readers to simply take our word for the viability of our proposal. So we tested,
and demonstrated, the existence of a climate ratings effect on capital
allocation through a series of incentivized survey experiments conducted
with over fifteen hundred participants. Our data provides strong evidence that
inclusion of a climate rating among the performance metrics considered by
investors significantly increases investment in the stock of companies with
favorable climate ratings, even when other stocks boast stronger performance
data. We further find that, consistent with insights from behavioral economics
and finance, the magnitude of the climate ratings effect depends on the
335. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1969).
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framing and format of ratings. This variance enables us to offer initial
recommendations for best practices along with suggestions for future
research.
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Appendix: Definition of Variables
Climate Variables

Definition

Generic Climate Rating

Indicator variable equal to one if participant was
randomly assigned to Generic Climate Rating
condition, zero otherwise.

Vulnerability to Climate
Change

Indicator variable equal to one if participant was
randomly assigned to Vulnerability to Climate
Change condition, zero otherwise.

Contribution to Climate
Change

Indicator variable equal to one if participant was
randomly assigned to Contribution to Climate
Change condition, zero otherwise.

Global Warming Pathway

Indicator variable equal to one if participant was
randomly assigned to Global Warming Pathway
condition, zero otherwise.

Control
(No
Information)

Indicator variable equal to one if participant was
randomly assigned to Control condition, zero
otherwise.

Climate

Dependent Variable

Definition

Share Allocation

Dollar amount invested in stock with most favorable
climate rating.

Control Variables

Definition

Female

Indicator variable equal to one if participant is
female, zero otherwise.

Age

Continuous variable measuring age of participant.

Education

Categorical variable based on highest level of
participant education: 1. Some high school; 2. High
school graduate; 3. Some college; 4. Associate
degree; 5. Undergraduate degree; 6. Master's degree;
7. Doctoral degree; 8. Professional degree (JD, MD).

Income

Categorical variable based on participant income:
1 if less than 10,000; 2 if $10,000-19,999; 3 if $20,00029,999;
4 if $30,000-39,999; 5 if $40,000-49,999; 6 if $50,00059,999;
7 if $60,000-69,999; 8 if $70,000-$79,999; 9 if $80,000$89,999;
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10 if $90,000-$99,999; 11 if $100,000-$149,999; and 12 if
above $150,000.
Understanding
Financial Products

of

Participants were asked "How well do you
understand financial products?" and responded on a
5-point Likert scale from 1="Not at all" to
5="Completely".

Stock Market Participant

Indicator variable equal to one if participant reported
investing in the stock market, zero otherwise.

Environmental Concern

Six-item version of the New Environmental
Paradigm scale3 3 6, a widely accepted set of questions
designed to capture respondents' attitude toward the
environment, where each item is scored from 1="Not
at all concerned" to 5="Very concerned".

Political Views

Categorical variable based on responses to question
"How would you describe your political views?"
where 1="Very Liberal", 2="Somewhat Liberal",
3="Neutral",
4="Somewhat
Conservative"
and
5="Very Conservative".

336. See Riley E. Dunlap & Kent D. van Liere, The "New EnvironmentalParadigm", 40 J.
ENV'T EDUC. 19 (2008); Riley E. Dunlap, The New Environmental Paradigm Scale: From
Marginalityto Worldwide Use, 40 J. ENv'TEDUC. 3 (2008).

